

SCHERMERHORN'S MONTHLY:

FOR

PARENTS AND TEACHERS.

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THE CULTIVATION OF THE MEMORY.

IS there not danger that, in the multitude of radical advisers on the paramount question of school-training, the faculty of memory may be quite thrust aside? The daily and weekly press, secular as well as religious, seldom lose an opportunity of thrusting a lance into what is called the most mischievous error of the schools, "parroting." The educational press have occasionally joined in this outcry, without considering that there may possibly be danger in yielding the whole point involved, without earnest protest. For the point covers a great deal more than appears at first sight, and its abandonment may involve that of the training of one of the most useful faculties we possess.

✓Surely, it may safely enough be granted that the mere learning of verbal definitions, rules, selections of poetry and prose, pages of history, and the parrot-like repetition of the same to the teacher, under the idea that this is schooling, is the most absurd folly. ✓Any such idea of the teacher's business embracing this and little or nothing besides, ought to show the utter unfitness of the person holding it to fill any position as a teacher of youth. But it may safely be questioned whether there are many persons of any experience in the business of teaching who hold such an idea, and base their practice upon

it. At least the number cannot be so large that it should occasion fear sufficient to warrant the attacks we so often read against the prevailing method of instruction. Within the limits of cities, towns, and well-organized school districts, it is becoming more and more difficult to find any considerable quantity of school-room work that lies open to such an objection. The whole tendency has been quite otherwise for a number of years.

The complaints that have found utterance through the public press are explainable enough, on another theory than "parroting." The lessons to be learned at home are in many cases most excessive in amount. They are given out often by pages, but are not intended to be committed to memory word for word. Unfortunately sufficient care is not always taken by the teacher to show what portions of the lesson are to be committed to memory, what are to be read carefully, and what may be either read hurriedly or left for class-room instruction on the morrow. If this is not done, the pupil has no other way left open to him when he prepares his lesson, than to memorize everything. This he seldom accomplishes. It is often hard, dry, technical and unintelligible. The mere mass frightens him, and unless he has uncommon natural powers, he abandons it unlearned with disgust. Such work presses still more heavily upon girls than on boys, because the young feminine mind seems to commit to memory the school lesson more readily than boys; at least it adheres to its work with a finer conscientiousness than does the average young masculine mind. So it happens that when the hours fly by and the task is unfinished, the girl's pride quite breaks down, and the whole sympathy of the family is evoked by her tears. It is therefore not wonderful if the paternal and maternal mind, losing all patience, inveighs strongly against memory lessons, and expresses itself when it can, through the avenues of the press, with more force than courtesy, finding a convenient term in the word "parroting."

The teachers have not been slow to perceive the popular complaint; at least, not so slow as the pungent newspaper articles indicate. The supply is, sooner or later, regulated by the demand, in teaching as well as in other callings, and so it has come to pass that in an anxiety to rectify this subject of complaint, we find a disposition to put the cultivation of the memory

in the background, and to elevate to its place the training of the reasoning powers. In that remarkable treatise on Education, the "*Émile*" of Rousseau, this great educational reformer, in his anxiety to free the minds of children from the pedantic training of the times, opens the flood-gates of his passionate soul in appeals to his readers to free the children from compulsory training of the faculties. It was the revolt of a powerfully sympathetic mind against what it believed to be the ignorant oppression of the schools. But, as a revolt, it carried the point quite too far, although unquestionably it served an admirable purpose in releasing educational methods from the choking ligatures of the age. It is the same tendency we notice in the disciples of Rousseau—the German school—to exaggerate that method, or system of methods, which for the time was uppermost in their minds. And precisely because such a reaction must be vigorous in its attempt to overthrow the deeply-rooted wrong methods which have provoked the reaction, arises the danger that the attack will be pushed much too far.

Through just such an anxiety to escape from the evil of excessive use, or abuse, of the memory in the public schools we have been brought face to face with the danger that we may be led to undervalue that faculty in our new methods in the school-room. "There is something very fascinating in the cry, "Cultivate the reasoning powers of the children," and something quite as powerful on the teacher's mind in the ridicule and caricature of the memory-work. Unquestionably the child is, to some extent, a reasoning being, and, as such, there can be no doubt as to the propriety of our recognizing this in our educational methods. But it is equally true that the reasoning faculty is very slow of development. The discipline of the intellectual faculties, from the simple habit of correct observation onward to the complex habit of weighing and testing the value of evidence, which, more or less, becomes the great business of the human intellect, is a well-nigh never-ending process of development. Nor can there be any doubt that this training should be begun at a very early day, both in school and at home. The reasons for right conduct, in particular, in connection with some personal experience, are reasons which a child soon apprehends. The reasons for certain operations in

science are much more difficult of apprehension, and must be proceeded with more carefully. But whether in conduct or in school studies, are not attempts by way of excessive explanation or talk, very likely to deceive the instructor in his endeavors to develop the reasoning powers? Scarcely any idea is more delusive than that our constant preachments to children, however plain they may appear to ourselves, must appear equally so to them; and look at it as we may, spontaneity in thinking is in great danger of being destroyed by excessive anxiety on the part of the teacher to impress his modes of thinking and reasoning on the pupil under twelve or thirteen years of age. How is this spontaneity to expand itself? Not by the child slipping its mind into the shell that the instructor or teacher has prepared for it.

There are a great many points in morals or conduct, as well as in school studies, that we cannot wait to reason into a young child. These must be accepted through the force of authority and as settled truths. There are other cases where the pupil must be left to puzzle them out for himself, or wait for the dawning of light that sooner or later comes to even the most moderately endowed intellect. These we trust to the operation of well-ascertained mental processes. But the great majority of young instructors, in particular, are in a hurry for results, and think that by constant talk their children will become reasoning, thinking beings. In this way they fancy that in some unexplained way they will be able to meet this new demand for the cultivation of the reasoning faculties, and the abolishment of "parroting."

✓ These remarks are only incidental to the object of this short article, a plea for the cultivation of the memory in our schools. Youth is the time for the exercise of this faculty. If it be neglected then, it becomes more difficult to perfect it as the years advance. Besides, the proper training of the memory is our main dependence for correctly-learned lessons. If the use of text-books is to be continued—and there is no prospect in the immediate future that they will be abandoned—what reliance is to be placed on our home work if the memory be neglected? It will be said that it is only the sense of the author that the teacher wants; he will be satisfied with the pupil's own language. But when is the young child to obtain its

vocabulary? From clever children of twelve years, or from others of fourteen, there is some prospect of obtaining an approach to a connected, intelligent answer in their own language; but most teachers know that it is frightfully wearisome work to place dependence on that. The truth is that very few children have a vocabulary of any extent from which they can draw, and one of the first things that we ought to do is to assist them in enlarging it. For this there can be no better plan, than committing to memory, with the utmost exactness, well-explained, simple language of a good writer. We say well-explained, because it is utterly wrong to require young children to learn what they do not understand. Possibly it was the doing of this that partly created the revolt in public opinion, expressing itself in that forcible word "parroting." A thoughtful teacher, on speaking of this very matter with the writer, remarked, that if he had the entire training of twelve children uninterruptedly, from seven years of age to twelve or thirteen years, he would undertake to furnish them with such a vocabulary and faculty of expression as would surprise me. He then added that he would do it by requiring them to commit to memory, at first, short pieces of pleasing poetry at least once a week. As the months flew on he would increase the amount. He would review these from time to time. When they learned to write, they should write these as exercises. As the years passed, prose pieces would be mingled with poetical extracts, and in the last two years, perhaps more, he would exercise them in turning the poetry into prose, and in expressing the prose in other prose of their own. Three things would thus be gained, the habit of exact memory, fullness of vocabulary, with facility of expression, and a well-stored collection of short, beautiful, and serviceable extracts for future life. There can be no question but that such a process of training would also powerfully influence the thinking of the children. Just as constant contact with good society influences the manners in youth, so would the habit of memorizing beautiful thoughts in time affect the mind, and weave itself in with all the processes of thought.

There can be no doubt that an exact memory is an immense blessing. The power of producing at pleasure not only the thought but its very form and texture just as it left the writer, every word marshaled in its proper place, instinct with life and

vigor and beauty—what would not one give for this in certain moods? But the words have floated away, the form has gone: we are like one who wearily seeks to restore the matchless but shattered ruins, or to carve anew the limbs of the mutilated Grecian torso. With poetry this is still more true than prose. With the latter, it is possible to make some approach to the thought, although we may not be able to repeat the exact words. Much may still be saved. But with poetry, how different! Try it with some extract from Shakespeare, from Byron, from Wordsworth, from Tennyson, or from some of our own renowned poets. The mind wanders, if there be a break; to confusion follows vexation, and what would otherwise be an unpurchasable pleasure, becomes an unsatisfactory as well as demoralizing regret over our own feeble memory. These attempts are, perhaps, in the seclusion of our own thoughts. Of what pleasure are we bereft when we wish to recall, for the enjoyment of our friend, the passages that gave us exquisite satisfaction. In society as well as before the public, to quote incorrectly is to involve us in ridicule. It is not only a mistake, it is a serious blunder. Society did not ask the quotation. If it accept it, it will only take it as a perfect thing, or not at all. The same is true with quotations from Scripture. Woe betide the poor wight who, among bible-taught people, substitutes a word for the old King James' translation.

✓ This admirable faculty of exact memory touches other things besides society and solitude. It enters into business, and powerfully affects the advanced student; it gives definiteness to our general thinking, and a consciousness of power, a firm tread to the paths over which the mind travels. ✓ Its more immediate training in the school will be further considered when we come to speak of the proper use of text-books, in another paper.

DAVID B. SCOTT.



THE proposed Philadelphia Museum of Art is to be in character and scope similar to the South Kensington Museum, providing opportunities and means of giving instruction in drawing, painting, modeling, and designing, in their industrial applications, through lectures, practical schools, and special libraries.

*A VISIT TO A NORMAL SCHOOL IN
FRANCE IN 1812.*

IN 1812 the Normal School from which so many of the men graduated who have rendered the French University illustrious, occupied a modest room in the top story of an old college and comprised about forty pupils, with three or four teachers. One spring morning, when the largest class in the school had assembled with their professor to discuss Latin Poetry and French Literature, the announcement was made that Count de Narbonne, Aid-de-Camp of Napoleon I., had come, with a few of his friends, to visit the institution. After a word of polite greeting, they seated themselves on a rude bench, and the recitation went on as before. The course consisted of different studies on some monument of art, followed by the reading of essays on moral or historical subjects, which were closely discussed. They were accustomed, in these exercises, to take the work of some celebrated writer and express their opinions about it, and that morning they had chosen for criticism part of the dialogue between Eucrates and Sylla, passages from a pamphlet on Marcus Aurelius, and a composition by one of the pupils on Fénelon. At the end of the two hours' session, the pupils respectfully saluted the Count, and were bursting to cry "Vive L'Empereur," so dazzled were young people with Napoleon's glory, notwithstanding the bloody tax they had to pay for it. The unexpected visitors disquieted our head-master, for although he admired Napoleon, he had at one time published a pamphlet of not very monarchical views, and therefore feared he might be badly marked in high places. But he was soon put at ease, for we learn that Narbonne, delighted with the school, had given a favorable report of it, saying if he could not foretell the literary career of the pupils, he had never before seen so many intelligent young people in a garret. "I was so anxious," says one of the younger teachers, "to ascertain all his impressions of us, that I went to Narbonne's house to see him, and was very much astonished at learning that the ruling head of Europe attached so much importance to an inspection of our small school."

"Napoleon," said Narbonne, "cannot dispense with thinkers,

and is very ambitious to have his reign marked by great literary works, as well as to be the head of a brilliant intellectual epoch, and he counts on the Normal Schools and Lyceums to effect this. He, therefore, wishes great attention to be paid to the classics and mathematics. Nothing escapes his eagle eye, and your choice of subjects for discussion displeased him. 'At present,' said he, 'men pursue studies only with reference to their professions, but I must create a civil profession which will work exclusively for letters and science; for since sound instruction distinguishes an Empire from military despotism, I am desirous of making France powerful in war, and just as ambitious to elevate all intellectual labor. We need a hundred Lyceums in the Empire, superior schools in all the great cities, and a University at the seat of every imperial court. The movement, which in the eighteenth century originated with the people, I desire to start from the throne, for my civil government is my greatest victory. What sound ideas could the conversation you heard yesterday about Sylla give the young? It is a mistake to hold him up to admiration. No one in the eighteenth century, except Frederick II., understood the art of governing. Tacitus, a discontented senator, who revenged himself with his pen and falsified history to write well, calumniates power and attacks Vespasian, one of the greatest of the Emperors, and both masters and pupils should be freed from such prejudices.' Now, I fancy Tacitus," said Narbonne, "so I rejoined: 'Sire, the conscience of mankind takes the part of Tacitus against the Cæsars of the world.' 'No, no,' replied Napoleon, 'an analysis of Cæsar's campaigns would teach them to recognize great commanders.'" Narbonne loved the Emperor, but he did not love absolute power, and believed Napoleon's reign would perish. He therefore replied that "the study of Marcus Aurelius was an excellent one for the young. The Antonines gave sixty years of happiness to mankind, and Marcus is their type. The description of the well-being of so many men through a single will, the commingling of moral greatness with supreme power, is worth contemplating, and the reign of such a virtuous prince is the only apology for unlimited power. No one else accomplished so much good, and he was a skillful general as well as a wise ruler." "Well! well!" said the Emperor, "the patriarchal reign of the Antonines shall be the retreat of my old age, when

I will spread industry and happiness everywhere, but I like Diocletian better than Marcus Aurelius. A great man both reflects and acts; what he has thoroughly decided on he executes at once. Sylla seized the power because he felt himself capable of holding it, and quitted it because he was old and sick. Public instruction is the foundation of good government and should be judicious and classical. Let the pupils read Corneille and Bossuet; they do not teach revolt, but strengthen order and peace. What a chef d'œuvre is 'Cinna!' The first time I read it, it gave me such new ideas. Cardinal Richelieu complained that Corneille was not decided enough. That modest man could not recognize the sovereignty of Genius in a Prime Minister, but he would have understood me. Bossuet is peculiarly the counselor for princes. How much I owe him!—and I might have learned more, but for the miserable method of giving scholars extracts. Pshaw!—young people have time to read connectedly, and imagination enough to seize events in the whole. The day I fell in with Bossuet's discourse on Universal History, the veil seemed rent from top to bottom, and the thoughts of this great man have never quitted me. If that pious bishop, so worthy of being a Cardinal, were now living, France would have no fear of Rome. But, to return to our subject. You cannot separate the literature of a people from their life. Books influence their conversation and sway the expenditure of their property, and while sound literature makes a people great, vicious renders it corrupt. Give the young grave studies and teach them to admire the true and beautiful." Such was the conversation of Napoleon just before the downfall of his fortunes.

INDIANA is determined not to be outdone by any State in an educational representation at the Centennial. The State Committee have recommended means by which each school may raise its portion of the needed funds. "Let no teacher, drawing his salary from the State, feel that he has done his duty as an educator until he has contributed something toward enabling the State to make its educational department such as no Indianian need be ashamed of."

A CLAM'S STOMACH.

III. MINERALS.

DESIRING to preserve some of the diatom skeletons, we proceeded in the usual way to bring this about. These skeletons being silica will resist, to a certain extent, the most powerful acids. So we put the entire contents of the stomach of the *Mya* into a test-tube with nitric acid, and exposed the mass to a boiling heat. The object was to destroy utterly the organic matter. We succeeded alas, beyond all expectation, for, owing to a blunder, the skeletons even, were quite destroyed. After repeated washing, and at last a thorough drying, the whole substance was reduced to a mere film, which discolored the bottom of the glass tube. A little of this intangible dust was carefully removed from the tube to a glass slide, and this was put under the microscope. There were great expectations, and a great disappointment. Not a trace of a diatom! Slide after slide was prepared—but nothing was found. It was too evident that all those exquisite forms had disappeared. It occurred to us to make the most of an investigation of the inorganic dust—inexpressibly fine, from *Mya's* stomach. The sight under a half-inch objective was quite pretty. It was really as a field strewn with fragments of bright clear white quartz. They were veritable Cape May diamonds, but badly broken up. These diminutive specimens had every character that is common to large fragments of the same mineral. The fracture was conchoidal, the luster vitreous. Each piece, so to speak, had its angular points, with occasional sharp-edges. The surfaces of fracture glistened after the manner, though not to the degree, of the facets of a well-ground diamond. Some of the surfaces were nearly opaque, owing to a minute roughness, which appeared like a white frost. But here and there in this brilliant display, were sundry yellow stones. They had none of the sharp fractures of the white quartz fragments. Their outlines were round and smooth, and they were somewhat flat. That we have here the real topaz is not probable; but the semblance is very like.

In this field of pretty stones we now alight upon something

which startles us with pleasant, though rather bewildering surprise, it recalls so vividly an event that once befell us. We had fallen in with a delegation of Navajo Indians, who had been on a visit to "the Great Father." The agent, thinking we might regard them as mere barbaric baubles, called our attention to a cluster of unpolished stones, which occupied a notable prominence in the middle of a heavy string of fine wampum beads that surrounded each swarthy neck. We gazed in astonishment, and then handled the gems with a feeling of fond delight, not, however, without some disgust at seeing these lovely things in such contiguity to the hideously vermilion-daubed faces of these savage warriors. On the dirty neck of each red-skin hung from six to twelve genuine turquoises. They were smooth opaque stones, from the size of a large pea to seven-eighths of an inch in length. They had irregular outlines, and were flattish, like almonds. Their color was a variable soft blue—what might be called a greenish blue. And how dear these gems were to those Red Men! Sell them they would not—but fight for them they would readily. And even here in this almost impalpable dust, enlarged by the microscope to the size of peas, were bluish green stones, marvelously like the turquoises of those Navajo Indians. They had just this difference—the color was darker, and more towards a green. Even in these minute fragments they are almost opaque, and only feebly translucent at their outlines.

In connection with the two minerals last mentioned, as seen under the microscope, two facts respecting the topaz and the turquoise may be mentioned. The Oriental topaz is mainly alumina in its chemical composition. The Bohemian topaz is simply silica—or yellow quartz. The turquoise contains no silica whatever. It is about one-half alumina, the remainder being phosphoric acid, copper, iron, and water. Of course chemical analysis is out of the question here; hence we can only speak of trivial resemblances. Noticeable, however, are their rounded edges, differing so much from the angular outlines of the quartz specimens.

All that has been described above belongs to that condition of the mineral known as amorphous. We have happily in our little film of mineral dust, some beautiful and distinctive crystals. One is now in the field. Its form at once decides it to

be a quartz, or rock crystal. It has six sides, and is a regular hexagonal prism. This specimen is terminated at one end by a pyramid. We displace the half-inch, and put on a quarter-inch objective. The edges of the planes of the prism are now made clean and sharp. On one plane, near its end, and crossing it diagonally is a line not very distinct. The color of the crystal is quite peculiar. It has a delicate smoky hue, which at the most transparent parts of the stone lightens up into a soft lavender. It is indeed a lovely gem, but so inconceivably small, for to the unaided eye it is invisible. Were it but larger, say half an inch in size, or even something less, we should have in all verity the smoky topaz, or Alençon diamond. As it is, it would take several hundred of them strung in row to make a necklace not longer than an inch, or one which would well suit that Queen Mab of the poet's fancy:

"In shape no bigger than an agate stone,
On the forefinger of an alderman."

But if possible we would know more of this pretty object. So the quarter inch is set aside for a good fifth objective. The line lying diagonally on one of the planes of the crystal is now a little better defined, we even suspect that it is itself a crystal. When interrogating Nature, the dullard hears her respond in vain. To try her votary she often answers with a hint; and if the hint be taken, by and by she yields the clear response. Encouraged by the faith that we are upon the right track, we turn now to our George Wale immersion twelfth. Ah, now the truth is out. The straight line on that crystal's plane is not a line at all. It is also not straight, but is at the middle a little bent, for just there it is thicker than elsewhere. In fact the line is now resolved into two crystals united at this thickened part, and both adherent to the face of the larger crystal. And now, by painstaking adjustments of the angle of light from the reflector, and the focus of the lens, we find besides this double crystal, three others, very much smaller, adhering like the twins to the faces of the larger gem. The stone is in fact a group of quartz crystals. There are at least five small ones adherent to the faces of one very greatly larger than they. But this excellent lens makes to us an unexpected revelation. If a carpenter should plane his boards across instead of lengthwise, however smooth his work might be, there

would be the marks to establish the fact. Now, almost invariably the faces of quartz crystals are covered with parallel marks crosswise, so to speak, as if a plane had been used thus upon them. Our lens shows these markings unmistakably, even upon this almost inconceivably small crystal.

But we have two other crystals in this film of dust from the stomach of our Mya. And how absorbingly full of interest have these proved to us. We have studied them with intense delight, hour after hour, until overtaken and surprised by the advanced morning hours. Small as these crystals are, we have no doubt of their true nature; and at the risk of seeming fabulous, we aver them to be true tourmalines. Their color is green. The most complete one is a bright, almost apple green. The other is quite dark, nearly an olive color. Each crystal has seven sides, or planes, and the first-mentioned one has a trihedral summit at one end. The other one has both ends broken off; and the edges of its planes are distinctly beveled. In this respect it is quite interesting. But for transparency, sparkle, and brightness of color, and completeness of form, the other crystal is the queenlier beauty of the two. This is verily the old Brazilian emerald. We can detect a peculiar behavior in the tints, as we vary the angle of transmitted light. But the tourmaline is notable for a singular optical quality, known as dichroism, by which is meant that it can give two different colors, one when the light is passed through it in the direction of the long axis of the mineral, and the other when passed in the direction of its shorter axis. But with this object almost infinitesimal in size, it was found impossible to carry out the conditions of the experiment.

Here ends this account of the patient inspection of the contents of a bivalve's stomach. What can be commoner in the popular estimation than the soft-clam of our shore lines? But how much have we found therein. The question is of this last find—whence came those gems? There is an old miller whose name is Time. Through the ages his mill has turned out mineral grist by grinding down the granite mountains. Nor does he reject from his hopper the tourmaline-bearing adamant of the North. The river channels are his leading troughs, and night and day they carry the grist of this ancient mill into that great bin, the sea. Pleasant was the poet's fancy—

"The toad
.....wears yet a precious jewel in his head."

But science finds a wealth of the beautiful and real, even in the slime of a Mya's gastric sack. A fauna, and a flora, and a mine of minerals are there.

SAMUEL LOCKWOOD.

SECRET SOCIETIES.

IN regard to secret societies, it may be justly said, that one ounce of practical knowledge is worth a pound of theoretical conclusions. It is alleged by the outside theorizer that these societies encourage their members to engage in habits of dissipation; to combine in rebellion against the good order and laws of college; and to shield the evil-doer by solemn pledges of sympathy and protection. Now, these are serious charges, and if true, then the morality of the colleges (and there are over three hundred of them) where secret societies exist, and where they include most of the students, must be in a truly shocking and perilous condition; while, on the other hand, the virtues of those Princeton youths, whose manly bosoms are never darkened by a Greek Letter Badge, must be wholly exceptional and shining. Nay, more, if the charges be true, then Princeton is a thousand years in advance of Harvard, and Yale, and Williams, and Rutgers, and some three hundred other similar institutions; for has not she alone had the moral telescope to see flaming and destructive comets coming up out of the mysterious realms of the secret society, and has not she alone had the moral courage to issue bulls and anathemas against the appearance in her latitude of these comets? And in the meantime have not all the other colleges been either morally stupid or moral cowards and flunkies?

It is more reasonable, we submit, to conclude that the charges are false, and what we want is not *theory* but *facts*. And where do we find more than *one* institution out of hundreds accusing secret societies of corrupting their members, or of arraying themselves against law and order, or of shielding evil-doers? And does anybody believe that in *fact*, the average morality of the boys at Princeton, where secret societies are fought, is any higher than at Williams and Rutgers, where secret socie-

ties are allowed? Who does not know that while there may be an air of mystery about the Greek letter badges and symbols, yet the societies are formed to promote intellectual and literary culture? This is not only their ostensible object, but it is the only bond that could hold good students and true men loyally to their society. It is not claimed that these secret societies are an unmixed good. Like every other human institution their influence is sometimes colored by the presence of bad men, but that they were organized and are in the main carried forward in the interest of excellence to be attained by practice in composition and declamation and debate, is notorious among students, and would be affirmed by a host of college professors, who themselves in student days were members of these fraternities. And, moreover, as Professor Chadbourne, of Williams, declares substantially, the bond of fellowship and of honorable pride afforded by a secret society is often employed with success in reclaiming stray students whom no other agency could so well reach. On the whole, we do not expect to see the Millennium ushered in at Princeton any earlier than elsewhere, albeit she has raised the black flag over the Greek symbols.

A SHREWD DOCTOR?

THE frequent mention of Princeton College in the dailies, weeklies, and monthlies of the land, has caused much thought and some inquiry among the friends of education. The quiet continuance in well-doing of our other colleges is quite in contrast with this course of Princeton, and it has been asked, how happens it, that Princeton in one way and another is ever before the public? How comes it that Princeton is continually praised in the papers, and our other institutions not? Are our other institutions dying out, and Princeton alone flourishing, or is Princeton herself pursuing some plan of advertising, and is she thus systematically puffing herself? We can help to answer these questions. Recently we received "with Dr. McCosh's compliments," a printed slip containing Dr. McCosh's remarks at the opening of the second term at Princeton.

We have only to say that if Dr. McCosh wishes to adver-

tise his college in our monthly, he must be content to appear in our advertising pages. It is rather too *canny* for the doctor to expect to praise himself and his college at our expense. And to the friends of our other colleges, we would say, do not imitate the doctor in this self-laudation. Dr. McCosh's enterprise may be worthy of imitation by the patent-medicine doctors.



READING AS AN INTELLECTUAL PROCESS.

THERE is a thing that education can invariably secure, and that is a ready consciousness that we do or do not obtain a clear, coherent idea from what we read. It would be unreasonable to demand that education should give us the power to understand all that we read; but it is perfectly reasonable to demand that it should give us the power to discriminate quickly between what we understand and what we do not understand; that it should develop that kind of attention which notifies us at once when we fail to get or comprehend clearly an author's thought. The failure here is one of the saddest features connected with the subject of reading, and indeed with the whole matter of common-school education. From the lowest grades to the highest our children read, learn, and recite passages without comprehending them, and, what is far worse, without realizing their want of comprehension. Any close observer and questioner can satisfy himself of this by a short visit to the school of his own district. This is an unpardonable weakness in the methods of instruction. It is a shame, and there can be no defense for it. From everything that he reads or learns, the child can and should get, not necessarily a correct idea, but an idea intelligible and coherent according to his powers; or else he should be perfectly conscious that he gets no such idea.

It has become chronic with college presidents, professors, and examiners generally, to complain of the inability of our youth to speak and write the language. If these wise men were as wise as they ought to be, they would discover that they have not yet reached the fundamental evil. They must probe deeper if they would reach the bottom. The foundation

of the trouble lies in the want of ability, or rather in the want of the habit of understanding language fully.

In spite of all our systematic education, there is a fearful lack of accurate comprehension of good English ; and this ever underlies the defect of expression. Of all the young men of whom the complaint is justly made, I do not believe there is one to be found who has the faculties well developed which are necessary to a good reader. The primary fault is not to be found in the instruction in composition, but in the instruction in reading, and this last includes every subject in which the pupil has a book to use. Show me a person who is a strong reader in the real sense of the term—one who has a strong power of attention, quick perception, active association, and other requisites to a fair mental reader, and I will show you a person who will not come far short of reasonable demands in his composition. The one follows the other naturally and invariably. This statement will be fully supported by any class after six months of faithful study of the English classics.

Of this want of comprehension there are several sources that are unwittingly fostered:

1. While children, we are compelled to study and read over and over again the same lessons. The mastery of words is made the end, and the only end, in the view of both teacher and pupil, instead of remaining to each as a means only, a subordinate matter. Curiosity, at that age the natural governor of attention, is destroyed ; and nine-tenths of our task-reading is performed with an indifference and a weakness of thought that do not deserve the name of reading. This will continue so until the reading matter put into our schools is greatly increased in variety and amount. Rarely, and only at long intervals, should a lesson be read more than once. The habit of seeming to read, of performing the physical part, while the mental faculties lie as dead, is easily formed. But it should be resisted. The problem before the primary teacher is this: To keep firmly fixed in the child's mind that the chief thing is the idea, while at the same time he is duly impressed with forms and words. Not only must the tongue utter, but the spirit must *see* what we read.

2. Also, in childhood we are allowed or required to read what we do not understand. A common illustration of one form of

this evil occurred recently in the closing exercises of a first-class normal school. The pupil-teacher was to exhibit her power by means of a lesson in writing to a large class of bright boys about seven years of age. She had placed upon the blackboard, as her copy, those four familiar lines,

"Work while you work,
Play while you play," etc.

The writing was certainly most admirable; but the inquiries of the lady principal revealed the fact that the children had not the least conception of the first two lines. Most, indeed, seemed not to have thought anything about the meaning. This is a sample—taken, however, from normal training—of the vast number of ways in which as children we are permitted or required to handle words without associating any meaning with them. The same may be seen in the thoughtless singing of our Sabbath schools. Thus words become the only things that we think of; and we lose the feelings which accompany clear comprehension or the want of comprehension. Accustomed to a dull tool, we lose the consciousness that it is dull. But let us rarely have a dull one in our hands, and how intolerable it seems to work with it! Blunt or keen perceptions upon things that we do not or cannot penetrate, and we become insensible to the fact that our instrument is dull and fails to perform its proper work. It is better, by all means, that the child should attach wrong ideas to all he reads, than that he should form the habit of reading without attaching any ideas. Let any friend of education look upon the stolidity of the average product of our schools, which comes from this mechanical, absolutely thoughtless reading, and he cannot but feel that we are producing a large amount of artificial stupidity. I do not say that pupils should *never* be required to read or learn what they do not comprehend; but I do not say that such should never be the requisition so long as they are in danger of falling into the habit of which I speak, nor until they have the habit of reading with the distinct realization that they do comprehend or that they do not.

3. I have said that the power of expression is possible only after a proper development of the capacity to receive impressions. The power and the habit of conveying thought will follow as a consequence of and in proportion to the power and

the habit of receiving thought. This plainly indicates the plan which should be adopted by any rational system of primary instruction in reading. As a matter of fact, however, the universal practice of teachers is in direct opposition to this principle. It is assumed on all hands that the practice of reading can have no other object than to impart elocutionary skill—to cultivate the power of oral expression. The great question which governs the method in this branch is not, Do we understand others? but how to make others understand us. It is taken for granted that distinctness of articulation, correctness of inflection, etc., surely indicate the presence of the thought within. Pupils are drilled almost daily in reading from the time they are six until they are sixteen, and yet they cannot read. They pass over that which to them is intelligible and that which is not intelligible alike, without the least discrimination. Words, words merely, are their only currency. Professors of elocution and teachers of reading do not impart the power we need. They teach as an accomplishment, but neglect our necessity. They make oral reading a high and important end, while it is simply a means, and should so be used. Our children are taught as though a large portion of their existence were to be spent in reading aloud; whereas probably not one-fiftieth of all the reading done by people in ordinary circumstances is of this kind. For most of us, it is our intellectual business in life to understand, to receive, to unload, as it were, that which others have put aboard. At least ability in this line is what we need infinitely more than the mere art of conveying thought. The number is comparatively small of those who are called upon to create, to body forth the soul either as orators or writers. The truth is, within the proper and legitimate sphere of school-reading, the cultivation of the organs of speech should be strictly subordinate to the great end of acquiring and retaining thoughts. The voice and ear have just that kind of work to do, and no other, which is performed by the gauge upon the steam boiler, viz., to afford a means of judging of the condition within—the one of the pressure of steam, the other of the clearness and coherence of ideas. The paramount object in learning to read is to acquire the power of obtaining from the printed page, and by means of the eye only, ideas clearly and quickly. This should be the

foremost thing with every teacher. Tone, emphasis, inflection, and general expression are, or should be, only the test-marks to indicate to the teacher whether or not the thought as presented by the printed words is fairly lodged in the mind of the learner. This perfectly subsidiary character of oral reading and the actual comprehension of thought are almost entirely lost sight of. The subject is taught as a fine art, an art of expression only, the same as music, instead of the art of soul-perception, the art of seeing and feeling ideas and sentiments.—*Popular Science Monthly.*



MARKS OF PARENTHESIS.

GENERALLY speaking, there is perhaps nothing connected with composition that is so unsatisfactorily taught or so poorly understood as the art of punctuation. Even good writers, so called, are often notoriously indifferent as to their "stops," and leave them to be inserted by the printer according to his best judgment. But printers, like all other mortals, are fallible. They sometimes fail to see the writer's thought, and consequently mispunctuate his words, even if they get these right. Or, if they comprehend his meaning, they sometimes either fail of the proper marks for bringing it out, or, not failing therein, insert them improperly.

Prominent among what may be deemed errors of punctuation is the extensive and apparently increasing misuse of the marks of parenthesis. In the first place, they are employed, not unfrequently, where their use is unnecessary. This is a growing blemish with some writers, who seem to think that everything of a parenthetical nature should be inclosed within parenthetical marks. An example or two will illustrate this.

1. "The dress now worn by women violates (not health, as Mrs. Woolson says, but) the laws of health."—*Literary World*, (Boston,) Dec. 1874.

2. "Of the three languages we may say that the German is (comparatively speaking) phonic," etc.—*Earle's Philol. Eng. Tongue*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford.) p. 184.

3. "In consequence of the long-continued cold weather from January to April, (much of the time being unusually inclement and frigid), the prospect was quite dubious."—*From a Hartford Paper*, Dec. 1875.

Now, there is no necessity, in any of these examples, for the marks of parenthesis. In the second, commas should have

been used instead. In the other two, the thoughts would be quite as clearly expressed without the parenthetical marks as with them, while all the sentences would present a much neater appearance without them. The same is true of the use of these marks in hundreds of other instances, where a moment's reflection on the part of the writer would prevent his inserting them.

But this is not all. Instead of being used as symbols of interjected or appended matter, which, however important, does not properly belong to the body of the discourse, they are too often regarded as having a grammatical function; they are made to usurp the place of the comma, as in the second of the foregoing examples, or of some other point. But, what is even worse than this, their use, especially in connection with other marks, is attended with manifold inconsistencies, as they appear in a very large proportion of the books and printed matter of the present day. A few examples will illustrate our meaning, and at the same time form a basis for our further criticisms.

4. "Is this an English usage (I don't mean the meal, but the grammar)?"—*Alford's Queen's English*, (Strahan,) p. 227.

5. "Is not this the same word that we have in *caury maury* (*vid. sup.* p. 255)?"—*Craik's Eng. Lit.*, (Scribner,) Vol. I., p. 263, note.

6. "If we ask who was the gainer by the death of his great ancestor, the answer is, the Patricians" (quoted from Dr. Angus's 'Hand-Book')."—*Turner's Handbook of Punctuation*, (Lippincott,) p. 62.

7. "He finds himself called upon to address the public,—and such a public! (applause)."—*The Old Stone House*, (Lothrop,) p. 102.

8. "The face of Moses shone with a preternatural lustre when he came down from Sinai, after his communion with his God. (Exodus xxxiv. 29 ff., and 2 Cor. iii. 7)."—*Baptist Quarterly*, (Bap. Pub. Soc.,) Oct. 1873, p. 455.

9. "Yet, (to give an example of this reasoning), Gabler, one of this school of critics, maintained" etc.—*Ibid.*, p. 459.

10. "A considerable part of our *v's* are of French extraction, being alterations (as referred to above, under *w*) of the old Latin *w*-sound (of *vox, venio, vivus*, etc.)."—*Whitney's Oriental and Linguistic Studies*, (Scribner,) 2d Series, p. 256.

11. "His father intended buying him a truck (it was before the days of velocipedes)."—*N. Y. Observer*, Oct. 21, 1875.

12. "Or why, if he were known to be so vile
(And who can hide his baseness at all times?),

Keep him in close communion to the last?"—*Arena and Throne*, (Lee and Shepard,) p. 93.

And we have even seen, at the end of a portion of a serial, printed in a line by itself in finer type than what preceded, the following punctuation:

13. "(To be continued)."

These are only samples of what might be multiplied almost indefinitely did space permit. But such punctuation is simply

disgraceful. It sets at defiance the very first principle of the art, the design of which is to mark the grammatical divisions of discourse, and aid the reader to the meaning of the words. Take examples 4, 5, 6, 11, 12. As these sentences are punctuated, what is there to show that the reader may not run right over the first parenthetical mark without the least pause, just as in example 1, or in the latter part of example 10? The mark of parenthesis certainly does not show this in the one case any more than in the other; it is not a pause-mark of any kind. If one reads such sentences correctly, he does it not through the aid of the punctuation, but in spite of it. We are aware that Wilson favors, to a certain extent, this style of punctuation. But his "Remarks" *a.*, *e.*, *g.*, and the first half of *b.*, on pages 168 and 169 of his "Treatise," (20th edition,) are based on an error. Take "Remark" *a.*, p. 168:

"If a point would not be required between those parts of a sentence in which a parenthesis occurs, none should be used along with the parenthetical marks; as, 'Are you still (I fear you are) far from being comfortably settled.'* Here these marks are unaccompanied by any point, because, in its simple state, the sentence would be without it; as, 'Are you still far from being comfortably settled?'"

On the same principle, it might be said that, in the last sentence of this "Remark," the words *in its simple state* should not be set off by commas, because, if these words were omitted or transposed, the sentence would not require any comma there. The same may be said of thousands of sentences. If we say, for example,

"Behold in flowers, *which bloom and die*, the emblem of thy state,"

we need to set off with commas the italicized clause. But, if we omit these interjected, semi-parenthetical words, the commas at once disappear,—"*Behold in flowers the emblem of thy state.*" On the same principle, points "*should* be used along with the parenthetical marks," if the parenthesis is not grammatically a part of what precedes or follows it, even "if a point would not be required" were the parenthesis omitted; as, "He

* We would say, in passing, that Wilson's first example given in illustration of the use of the marks of parenthesis, as well as this, would, in our judgment, be better marked by dashes than by marks of parenthesis, inasmuch as there is a complete break or interruption in the flow of the thought: "The Egyptian style of architecture—see Dr. Pocock, not his discourses, but his prints—was apparently the mother of the Greek." So too, "Are you still—I fear you are—far from being comfortably settled?"

writes the date, (1369,) in words at full length,"—not, "He writes the date (1369) in words" etc.

In some of the foregoing examples, as 3, 8, 9, it will be observed that the point belonging to the parenthesis is not embraced by the last of the parenthetical marks. The reason commonly assigned for such punctuation is that the parenthesis is thus shown to be related to what precedes rather than to what follows. But this is no argument whatever, for a parenthesis always relates to what precedes, not to what follows it.

In other examples, as 4, 5, 6, 11, the parenthesis is left without any punctuation mark at the end, the point following the final parenthetical mark belonging to what precedes the parenthesis. Why this should be, we cannot conceive. Since the marks of parenthesis are not indicative of any pause whatever, the true principle of using them,—one which is observed in the issues of the American Bible Society, and in some other of our best and most carefully printed issues,—is to punctuate just as if no parenthetical marks were to be used; then inclose within the marks the parenthetical portion, including the stop—comma, period, or whatever else it may be—at the end of the parenthesis. In illustration, we recur to the preceding examples. If example 1 must be encumbered with parenthetical marks, it is properly punctuated. In example 2, the parenthetical marks should be commas. In examples 3 and 9, they should be removed; they are unnecessary. If not removed, the comma that follows the last of them should precede it; for, properly speaking, the comma is a part of the parenthesis as truly as the included words themselves. In example 4, the interrogation point should stand after *usage*, for this is where the question ends. Then the word *grammar* should be followed by a period, after which naturally belongs the closing parenthetical mark. Example 5 should read,

Is not this the same word that we have in *caury maury*? (Vid. *sup.*, p. 255.)

In like manner the rest should be as follows:

6. "If we ask, Who was the gainer by the death of his great ancestor? the answer is, The Patricians." (Quoted from Dr. Angus's Handbook.)

7. He finds himself called upon to address the public,—and such a public! (Applause.)

8. (Exodus xxxiv. 29 ff., and 2 Cor. iii. 7.)

10. — being alterations, (as referred to above, under *w*.) of the old Latin *w*-sound (of *vox*, *venio*, *vivus*, etc.)

11. His father intended buying him a truck. (It was before the days of velocipedes.)
 12. Or why, if he were known to be so vile,
 (And who can hide his baseness at all times?)
 Keep him in close communion to the last?

This gives to each word, or phrase, or clause, or sentence its true and proper punctuation, and leaves nothing to be inferred or blundered over by the reader. S. W. W.

WHOSE IS THE FAULT?

WE find in one of our New York exchanges an anecdote which can serve us for a text, and we quote it accordingly:

"Some months ago, a private coachman was quietly trotting his pair of horses over one of the drives in Central Park, when he was suddenly ordered by the lady inside to drive up on the turf at the side. Without one word or one moment's hesitation, he turned the iron-shod feet of the horses and the iron tires of his wheels directly on to the smooth-cut lawn, and just as the hind wheels cleared the gravel, there came rushing by a runaway pair of horses, broken carriage and harness swinging at their heels. His unquestioning obedience to orders had saved one if not two lives."

It was an extreme case, but it has many times since occurred to our mind in watching servants, clerks, the employee of any class, and, last, the children in our school-rooms and in our homes.

The habit of exact obedience seems to be dying out, if indeed it ever existed. A little less or a little different, a little more to the one side or to the other—the performance does not match the command or the direction. Indeed, there are very few, either of children or servants, who really believe that any one means precisely what he says, neither more nor less.

Looking now for the cause of this divergence from the straight line of obedience, we are met by the reflection, that in order that the above related incident might occur, there must have existed certain conditions in the lady who gave the command. It is evident that she must have been a person who had habitually good reasons for her conduct, that she saw clearly what ends she wanted to attain and the means for attaining them,

that she was accustomed to say exactly what she meant, and that this was her character as understood by her coachman. Therefore, he had no hesitation, though he could see no reason for the command, though it was one calculated in every way to outrage the sense of propriety which characterizes a New York coachman. He did exactly as he was bid, and instantly: And so, lately, instead of watching the servants and the children, to complain of their careless following of directions, we have turned our observation in the other direction, and have been astonished to discover how few parents, masters, or mistresses, or teachers, are in the habit of giving to their subordinates exact directions; that is, directions which cannot be misunderstood. That this is not easy to do, every one who has at all observed the legal formulæ necessary for State documents, or even for conveyances of property, will admit. And even with all the safeguards that can be constructed out of words, it seems as if there were no law out of which some acute lawyer cannot find a loop-hole of escape. Language itself is an imperfect instrument for thought, but in the hands of one who uses it unskillfully, it is like a blacksmith's sledge-hammer used upon a watch.

We have come to the conclusion that the failure in obedience, of which we hear so much complaint nowadays, has its source, no more in the want of training in those who receive the orders, than in the want of training, first in exact thought, second in exact use of language, in those who give the orders. Therefore, it would seem to be the clear duty of teachers especially, because they have to direct the growing part of the people, whose habits are forming day by day, to cultivate in themselves exact thinking and an exact use of language.

As means to the first, some hard study is necessary; as means to the second, a careful study of our own language by means of study of foreign languages.

Fortunately, however, for the teacher, whose time is limited, the very study of languages which we have recommended for the second object, is, if we consider the ancient languages, the best fitted to accomplish the first object. Our lesson points; therefore, as is at once seen, to the necessity of more study of language in its many forms by all those who, being teachers, are responsible for the habits of the school-children.—*American Journal of Education.*

SCHOOL DISEASES.

IT is a serious question whether we are not getting what is called education at too exorbitant a price, when the health and usefulness of eyes are impaired or sacrificed. And the mischief that is done to eyes in schools and colleges may safely be taken as an indication of the damage that is inflicted upon other parts of the body. Objectors may, perhaps, say that the appalling statistics obtained by the foreign observers could not be gathered in American schools and colleges. I believe that they might, and I found my belief upon twenty years' work among just the classes of subjects tabulated by Cohn and the other Continental observers. I believe that our system of education, if, indeed, we may be said to have a system, is one of the most damaging in its effects upon the growing bodies of scholars of any in the world. Let any one familiar with hygiene take the pains, as I have, to inquire carefully into the physical effects of curricula of our leading schools and colleges, and he will be compelled to confess that there is the greatest cause for reform. The attention which is paid to gymnastic exercises and other methods of physical culture does not correct the evils. It often happens that those who really need physical exercise most do not get it, or that the exercise is excessive, and does harm to those who engage in it. What we need in our school and college curricula is a diminution of the hours of labor. The working hours too often extend from eight or nine in the morning to ten or eleven at night. The strain thus put upon growing bodies is too great. Some method should be devised by which much that now involves a persistent use of the eyes in confined and unnatural postures of the body could be accomplished through the use of models or photographs, or the blackboard. Much that is now attempted to be taught by badly-printed books might be taught orally or by some form of object-lessons. Even if such radical changes could not be accomplished, much might be done toward lessening the evil effects of our present method by shortening the hours devoted to study, by correcting defects in the architecture of class and study rooms, by improving the ventilation, heating and lighting of school-houses, and by diffusing information among the parents of

scholars, so that there may be less in the home-life that is prejudicial to health. And just here we touch the very fountain of evil. Our schools cannot be much, if any, above the intelligence of their patrons. I do not blame the teachers for the evils in our systems of education. I blame boards of trustees and other school and college boards for not applying the principles that have already been worked out by scientific men. If architects and boards of managers of schools and colleges would apply in the construction and conduct of their institutions of learning even a few of the principles that sanitarians all agree upon, we would at once see a reduction in those forms of disease which are traceable to their present neglect.—*Sanitarian.*



COMMON SENSE VENTILATION.

THE best practical statement I have met with about ventilation was contained in the remark of a mining engineer:

“Air is like a rope; you can pull it better than you can push it.”

All mechanical appliances for pushing air into a room or a house are disappointing. What we need to do is to pull out the vitiated air already in the room. The fresh supply will take care of itself if means for its admission are provided. It has been usual to withdraw the air through openings near the ceiling—that is, to carry off the warmer and, therefore, lighter portions, leaving the colder strata at the bottom of the room, with their gradual accumulation of cooled carbonic acid undisturbed. Much the better plan would be to draw this lower air out from a point near the floor, allowing the upper and warmer portions to descend and take its place. An open fire, with a large chimney-throat, is the best ventilator for any room. The one-half or two-thirds of the heat carried up the chimney is the price paid for immunity from disease. And large though this seems, from its daily draft on the wood-pile or coal-bin, it is trifling when compared with doctors' bills, and with the loss of strength and efficiency that invariably result from living in unventilated apartments.

TEACHER'S REST.

STEPS have been taken towards the founding of an institution under the above name, for the relief of infirm and invalid teachers. The originators of the enterprise are ladies who have been long personally engaged in teaching, and the need of such an institution they know to have been painfully felt in cases that have come under their own observation. They think it is a project that will interest *all* members of the profession, and, in appealing to the benevolent *public* for aid in beginning their work, it is chiefly to the more prosperous and influential of their own number that they look for support and encouragement in carrying it on.

They have not proposed a gigantic establishment, so wanting in the home-like aspect which they desire to preserve, but rather look forward to the multiplication of small households in various locations as they shall be called for.

The object of the "Rest" is primarily for those who are unfitted by the infirmities of age or disease for the active duties of their calling. But it is hoped, also, that its shelter may be extended to such as are temporarily out of employ or needing a short relaxation from duty. A nominal rate of board will be charged, in order that no one, however independent in spirit, may shrink from applying for admission. But the managers reserve the privilege of reducing or remitting this charge according to the circumstances of the applicant.

A building has been purchased for the inauguration of the work. It is on the Hudson River, near West Point, in the midst of beautiful and attractive surroundings, and will accommodate twelve inmates. Five thousand dollars is needed for the purchase and outfit of the establishment, and the Committee call for help to raise this amount. Contributions in money, annual subscriptions, donations of furniture, household linen, carpets, etc., etc., will be most acceptable, and may be sent to Miss Clement, Treasurer *pro tem.*, at Germantown, Pa.

Six gentlemen have been elected Trustees, and a Charter will soon be applied for. Of these, Rev. E. Jay, of Tomkins Cove; Ch. C. Jones, and Dr. S. B. Ward of N. Y., and Mr. H.

H. Houston of Germantown, have accepted. The Board of Lady Managers consists of Mrs. Jay, Mrs. Ernst, and Miss Bérard of West Point, and Miss Clement of Germantown.

WASTE OF LIFE IN SCHOOL-ROOMS.

THE report which Dr. Lincoln made to the Social Science Association at its late meeting, on the cause of the disgraceful waste of life in American school-rooms, is singularly complete in its method of denunciation of well-known abuses. It begins as follows: "First. School work, if performed in an unsuitable atmosphere, is peculiarly productive of nervous fatigue, irritability, and exhaustion. Second. By 'unsuitable' is chiefly meant 'close' air, or air that is hot enough to flush the face, or cold enough to chill the feet, or that is 'burnt' or infected with noxious fumes of sulphur or carbonic oxide. Third. Very few schools are quite free from these faults." The remainder of the report is equally pointed, but we call special attention only to that portion of it which is of most interest to undertakers, and to affectionate parents, who are also school committee-men, or who are in the habit of raising a voice in town meetings. The cheapness of good air, and the frightful cost of impure air, is here treated according to scientific principles, and according to facts as they exist. No desired reform can be brought about so cheaply as that of the giving of fresh air to school-children.—*Christian Union.*

A WONDERFUL CURE.

DR. McCosh, the venerable President of Princeton College, informs us, with his "compliments," that formerly some of the Princeton "students thought it no sin to lie to the faculty." He had to take "severe measures;" but he has cured them. *Mirabile dictu!* The Millennial must be near—surely the Centennial!

But why do not the reformed Princeton students reciprocate and cure the worthy doctor of his reckless boasting?

ANIMAL LIFE IN THE OCEAN-DEPTHS.

IT was, for many years, thought that, beyond the depth of 300 fathoms, organic life ceased to exist in the ocean. Forbes reached this zero of life in the Ægean Sea, and the fact ascertained for the Mediterranean was inferred for all other seas. The transmutation of inorganic into organic matter is only performed by vegetables, and then only under the controlling power of light. The distinction made by naturalists between the lowest forms of animal and vegetable life lies just here; vegetables convert the inorganic elements of earth, air, and water, into organized matter; animals re-arrange this organized matter into animal tissue. It is well known, as no light penetrates the profounder oceanic depths, that no vegetation can exist there; an absence of animal life was therefore inferred. Certain exceptions to this definition of vegetable life, as being exhaustive, are found in the *Fungi*, which germinate and grow in darkness, and it is believed are nourished in great measure by organic matter, as well as in the curious carnivorous plants, which have of late attracted so much attention. This, however, does not invalidate the truth that all nutriment, in order to be fit for the maintenance of animal life, must pass, at least once, through the transmutation effected only by vegetation.

The non-existence of life below 300 fathoms, in all the oceans of our globe, was strongly supported by Forbes's investigations in the Mediterranean. The abyssal depths of the sea were thus determined by logic to be the universal empire over which reigned darkness, desolation, and death. No investigations were made as to the facts of the case. Logic and a hasty generalization from inadequate knowledge were made, once again in the history of science, to do duty for the more laborious method of patient observation. Commerce at last gave the impulse to deep-sea exploration, which had before been lacking. The commercial world demanded a more speedy mode of communication from continent to continent, and the response came in the form of the submarine telegraph. Thousands of soundings were made to determine the best position in the ocean's bed for its successful laying, and thousands, again, to

secure the broken end after the first failure. These soundings and grapplings brought from the sea-depths unmistakable proof that life in many varied and exquisite forms existed there, far away from light and vegetation, under an enormous pressure of superincumbent waters, and logic retired discomfited.—*Popular Science Monthly*.

SWINTON'S "COMPREHENSIVE COURSE
IN GEOGRAPHY."

MR. SWINTON claims to embody in his book all that is best in modern methods of geographical teaching, and to present the subject so that the physical aspects and attributes of the globe and man's doings on its surface, form, in place of isolated phenomena, a living organic whole. If the work justifies the claim it is certainly the very book the country calls for. But does it? Does it differ essentially in matter, method or spirit from the old-time text-books it is intended to supplant? Let us see.

The first step takes the pupil off his feet and into a region of thought the most remote from his daily life. Mathematical Geography—the least intelligible department of the science to the beginner, certainly in advance of considerable mathematical training—is made the starting-point, and a mass of astronomical information, as useless as bewildering to young minds, follows hard after. Next the pupil is expected to master a lot of technical terms which he has no immediate use for, illustrated by references to parts of the world he has presumably never heard of. Then he enters upon an untimely discussion of the conditions of climate, the distribution of life, animal and vegetable, the races of men and the wants, occupations, states of society, and political organizations of mankind: all possibly in perfect accordance—as the author claims—with "the best methods of geographical teaching as practiced in the leading cities of our country, from Boston to San Francisco," but certainly not in accordance with the dictates of common sense, taking into account the mental condition and intellectual needs of school children. It lays hold of the subject wrong end first, presupposes knowledge which the pupil cannot

have, and violates the most essential conditions of sensible, scientific teaching. The proper place for all such general discussions is at the other end of the book, after the pupil has been prepared for them, led up to them, so to speak, by degrees. The fact that these subjects are more or less cleverly presented is evidence rather of the author's dexterity in book-making than of his ability to apprehend and meet the real wants of pupils. The method is radically vicious.

Accepting the method as right, the book throughout shows indeed great elaboration and more than ordinary care in the adjustment of details: but after all it is a cram-book. For those who know nothing of the methods of scientific teaching, that is to say true teaching, and rate class-room convenience above everything else, it is, in fact, the perfection of book-making. Those, however, who judge it from the standpoint of the pupil's needs, the standpoint of culture, will not think so highly of it. It deals too much with glittering generalities and vague expressions often repeated,—phrases which seem to tell much, yet, to children, are practically meaningless. In the author's own words, "the paragraphs are cast in a form convenient both for memorizing and recitation," and each paragraph is introduced with bold type "so that a suitable question spontaneously frames itself in the minds of pupils and teachers," as though the class-room bounded the usefulness of a text-book.

For our part we should have preferred less formality and greater vividness of style, accounting permanence of impression and the cultivation of scientific habits in observing geographical phenomena far superior to glibness of recitation or facility for cram. We are suspicious too of the effect of so much deference to form. After the pupil has had the black-faced framework before his eyes a few months, the contents changing daily, there is danger that it will overshadow everything else, the particular filling in for individual States and countries becoming deplorably hazy. The most objectionable feature of the book, however, is, in Hibernian phrase, its omissions. What is given is, for the most part, correct in point of fact, and well enough worth knowing, though not of prime importance; but the amount of matter is pitifully small. Countries that would be meagerly described in half a column are disposed of in half a dozen lines. At first we could not account for such defi-

ciencies and the spreading of so little information over so many broad pages. When we found by actual measurement, however, how large a part of the book is given over to pictures the mystery was solved. We believe in picture-books for children; still we doubt the propriety of making a picture-book of a school geography, to the serious curtailment of matter that must be too limited at best. To give, as Mr. Swinton has done, one-third as much space to pictures as to descriptive text, and quite as much as to maps, seems in our judgment like over-doing the matter. With fewer illustrations—which, excellent as they are as pictures, rarely help the pupil to a clearer apprehension of the characteristic features of the regions under description, their people or their ways of living,—the author, had he been able to appreciate the value of such knowledge, might have found space to say something about a great many neglected matters of use and interest, valuable as well for purposes of instruction as for developing habits of thoughtfulness, intelligent observation, and a practical appreciation of the every day use of geographical knowledge. At least he need not have left the pupil to infer that the oceans are geographically of no account; that those great arteries of commerce and social intercourse, continental railways and oceanic steamship lines, have no relation to the physical aspects and attributes of the globe or to man's doing on it; or that trans-continental telegraphs and ocean cables are equally insignificant, geographically considered. The maps are blurred with useless names and petty details, yet there is scarcely a sign of these most important geographical factors of modern civilization.

Go before a class in geography using a book of this sort, and ask a hundred questions suggested by the news columns of the morning paper; you will be fortunate if ten are intelligently answered from information got from the book. Here is a telegram from Melbourne, dated day before yesterday. By what route did it reach us? And why should there be facilities for such quick communication to and from that remote quarter of the globe? Another dispatch, from Bombay, dated yesterday. How did that come? It says that heavy rains have injured the cotton crop thereabout. Why should that be of interest in New York? What countries supply the cotton of commerce, and what is their relative annual yield? Another dispatch,

from Rangoon, says that yesterday the flooded Irawaddy was overflowing miles of rice-fields in Burmah, doing immense damage. How does Burmah rank as a rice-growing country? And how much rice is required for the world's annual consumption? Another, from St. Petersburg, announces that the Russians entered Kashgar four days ago. What is Russia doing there in the center of Asia, and why? Another, from Rio Janeiro, says that two days ago the Emperor applied to the Chamber of Deputies to sanction his projected visit to the United States and Europe; another comes from Calcutta with reference to the Prince of Wales's tour through India; others, more or less recent, speak of affairs in Japan, in Turkey, in Spain, in Chili, and elsewhere. Is it too much to expect of a school geography to give such information as will enable pupils to read such news intelligently, at least to understand how such intelligence travels if not why it is worthy of transmission?

Is space too limited? Then why not economize space by the omission of matters of less importance educationally regarded; by telling nothing in the text that is already given on the maps; by the avoidance of many repetitions of details that could be more simply, clearly, and forcibly presented in mass? A single chart, for instance, showing the sources of the staples of commerce, with tables giving the annual product of each in the chief regions of production, would occupy much less room and be vastly more instructive than the multitude of indefinite mentionings here given. Ask a school-boy where wheat is grown, what countries produce the wheat of commerce, and the bulk of an average crop; where coffee is grown and what undeveloped countries are suitable for coffee-culture, how the crop of Brazil compares with that of Arabia, or Venezuela, or Ceylon or Java; what are the sources of caoutchouc, and what is the yearly product; what countries furnish the bulk of copper used, and how much a year; what the silk harvest of the world is, and how much of it comes from China, Italy, Japan, or France; what countries are rising countries, what declining, and the chief causes of their varying condition; whether there are any railways in South America or in China,—or almost anything else a man of the world would think of, and he will probably tell you that his geography does not speak of such things. Yet the number of insignificant facts and fictions he will have

committed to memory, will be fearful to think of. He will tell you, for instance, after Mr. Swinton, that the "Feejeeans were formerly ferocious cannibals, but, through the influence of the missionaries, *many* of them have now given up the practice of eating human flesh;" but you need not ask him why their islands were made a British protectorate, or what their commercial importance is likely to be. He will give you the precise location of Cape Yorke, Australia, but will not know whether the annual wool-clip of the thriving colonies on the other side of that youngest of the continents is one ton or a million. He will tell you that "man derives his food from both plants and animals," but you will ask him in vain for any specific information in regard to food-producing plants or animals,—how the potato, for instance, compares with the manioc, the apple with the banana, rye with rice, in distribution, productiveness, or food-value. He will tell you confidently that "in polar regions vegetation is confined to mosses and lichens," and doubtless be amazed when you tell him that the statement is true only of the regions about the South Pole, or that the most successful explorers northward have not succeeded in getting beyond the range of dandelions, chick-weeds, grasses, birches, bilberries, the yellow poppy, mustard, starwort and scores of other flowering plants, not wholly unknown generically in our door-yards. He will tell you that New England exports ice to "the winterless Carolinas and Florida," unaware that Europe and Asia come in for a share of a trade whose tonnage ranks with that of King Cotton or more kingly grain. He will tell you that our interior States export "immense quantities" of meats and bread-stuffs, but how many tons a year of either, or through what channels, his geography will have given him no idea.

But it is useless to multiply illustrations of redundancy of vague general statements and inconsequential details on the one hand, or deficiencies in matters of scientific, social, and commercial interest on the other. If these faults were all corrected the book would still fail through defects of method and the absence of the true spirit of modern geographical science.



THE State Commissioners of Common Schools in Ohio have decided to prepare a history of education in that State.

ELEMENTARY INSTRUCTION IN LATIN.—II.

WE venture to "examine farther" the productions of American authors, and the essentials of an elementary course in Latin. The first essential we believe to be an easy and progressive reader in the best Latinity. The article of December, 1875, was devoted to the question, whether J. H. Allen was competent to prepare such a work. We would now apply the same test to J. B. Greenough. We have before us the "*Latin Composition by J. H. Allen and J. B. Greenough*," the "*Method*," by same authors, and the "*Key*" to both of these books.

The authors say: "The Key for the use of teachers has necessarily cost a good deal of labor in the preparation." The composition is intended for "the last year of preparation for college, or the first year of a college course." The Key is hence intended for college professors. Although it has only 29 pages, part of which consists of passages from the ancient authors, the blunders contained in that part which has been composed or translated by Messrs. A. & G. are so numerous that we must confine ourselves to a selection. There is hardly a chapter in Grammar, the rules of which have not been violated by them, from inflections to moods and clauses, not to mention the pitiable school-boy Latinity that runs through the whole of their part of the work. If there is a book containing one-tenth of the blunders within the same space, we do not know it.

A. The following we consider as "typographical" errors:

P. 8, l. 7, "*consilia dedit*," for *dederunt* ; p. 9, l. 9, "*quidam*," for *quidem* ; p. 10, l. 27, "*classem eo nomine dignum*," for *dignam* ; p. 11, l. 5, "*toto orbi*," for *toti orbi* ; p. 12, l. 30, "*post tempore Graccharum*," for *tempora Gracchorum* ; p. 13, l. 29, "*dilectiones*," for *delectiones* ; p. 21, l. 8, "*Romani advenerunt*," for *Romam* ; p. 21, l. 21, "*participendis*," for *participandis* ; p. 21, l. 2, from below, "*multam*" for *multum* ; p. 23, l. 9, *me* left out before *Archias* ; p. 23, l. 3, from below, "*in una*" for *in unam* ; p. 24, l. 4, "*avertandum*" for *avertendum* ; p. 24, l. 27, "*legiones ductos*" for *ductas* ; p. 20, l. 3, "*gloriam victoriam*" for *victoriæ* ; p. 24, l. 1, from below, "*fungimus*" for *fungimur* ; p. 28, l. 12, "*consentiri*" for *consentire*.

Two errors, p. 6, *paries fissa* for *fissus*, and p. 19, *egredieris* for *egrederis*, the authors have themselves corrected on a slip fastened to a fly-leaf. As the book contains only 29 pages, 18 "typographical" errors (after a revision) seems unduly large.

B. We proceed to the blunders against the rules on the INFLECTION OF WORDS.—1. P. 14, 11. *Utilitatum*. The gen. plur. of *utilitas* is *utilitatum*, not *utilitatum*. Besides *civitas*, only a few nouns in *as* take *ium*, and *utilitas* is not one of them.—2. P. 29, 1. *Exemplum vis*, example of violence. *Vis* forms no gen. sing. In Tac. Or. 26 (*plus vis*) the reading is questioned.—3. P. 17, 4. *Sæviter*, for *sæve*. Adjectives in *us* form their adverbs in *e*, not *iter*. See Allen and Greenough's Gr., p. 84, *a*. True, Plautus used *sæviter*, but he uses the ending *iter* for all adjectives. Taking him as a standard, Allen and Greenough's rule would be wrong.—4. P. 19, 4. *Hæc ficus carptæ sunt*, for *hæc ficus*. The nom. plur. fem. of *hic*, *hæc*, *hoc* is not *hæc* but *hæ*.—5. P. 17, 1. *Romulus Remusque aduluerunt* for *aduleverunt*. *Adolescere* makes the perfect *adolevi*, not *adolui*.—6. P. 20, 1. *Veientes urbem relinquerunt*, for *reliquerunt*. *Relinquere* has *relinquo*, *reliqui*, *relictum*.—7. P. 19, 3. *Quas impertiti sunt*, for *impertiverunt*. *Impertire* is no deponent, though Terence has it so once, which, of course, cannot be imitated.—8. Words are used which do not exist, as: (a) P. 12, 12; *conjuratores*, conspirators (for *conjurati*). *Conjurator* is no Latin word; still, in the vocabularies to the "Composition," and the "Method," we find *conjurator*, gen. *oris*, a conspirator!!—(b) P. 23, 3: *Poseidon* (as vocative for *Neptune*). *Poseidon* is not used by any Latin author, as little as *Zeus*.—(c) P. 5, 8: *Falerius*, is no word whatever.—(d) P. 19, 2. *Popilius Læna* (both in Key and Composition) inst. of *Lænas*.

C. We now take up the syntactical blunders against the rules for the use of CASES. 1. P. 9, 4. *Bocchus MISERITUS EST fugurthæ FORTUNAS*, for *fortunarum*. Comp. Allen and Greenough's Gr., p. 120, *c*, 1.—2. P. 15, 14. *Nomen Scævolæ quod significat IS qui manu sinistra utitur* (for *eum qui*). Transitive verbs govern the accusative. A. and G.'s Gr., p. 131, 1.—3. P. 26, 1. *XXXV millia HOMINES* for *hominum*. See Allen and Greenough's Gr., p. 43, *d*.—4. P. 20, 1. *Ei erit victoria qui juvenecam mactabit*, where *ejus*, the genitive of the possessor, not the dative, must be used, as opposed to the other party. See A. and G.'s Gr., p. 127, Rem.—5. P. 21, 1. *Quod Marium ex urbe nostra EGESTATE et SQUALORE ejecimus* (ejecting Marius from our city in poverty and rags). This ablative of quality is faulty in two respects: 1, because such ablatives can only be used with reference to the *subject* of a verb when they denote—as here—accompanying circumstances: 2, because they *always* require

qualifying adjectives. See Allen and Greenough's Gr.,* p. 141, 7. Of course, it ought to have been "*Marium egentem et squalidum ejecimus.*" 6. P. 28, 3. *Verum est illud responsum Themistoclis* SERIPHIO CUIDAM (the reply of Themistocles to a Seriphian.) The Latin authors use the harsh construction of verbal nouns with an attributive dative, only in a few conventional phrases, and when it is unavoidable. This was certainly not the case here, and it was ridiculous to deviate from the plain and elegant verbal construction used in this very passage by Cic. Sen. 3, 8. Decidedly faulty is the connection of such datives with subject-genitives, especially if placed *after* the governing verb.

7. About the use of the cases in local relations* (the locative case, etc.) we find curious blunders. P. 3, 5. *Hannibal exercitum Romanum Cannis vicit*, which would mean that the battle of that name took place *in* that village.—8. Similarly, p. 20, 2: *Antii navem morantem*, which would be "a ship stopping *in* the city of Antium," a curious kind of city and ship, seeing that the ship was on the sea, and Antium was a sea-board town.—9. P. 3, 3. Here the genitive is used in place of an ablative: *Duas epistolas a te accepi Corcyrae datas*, which sentence is taken from Cic. Fam. 4, 14, where the faulty reading *Corcyrae* is corrected into *Corcyra* in the recent editions. The place at which letters are dated, at least if connected with *dare*, in the context of letters, is *always* placed in the ablative with or without the preposition *de* or *ab*, as "*quam de phaselo dedisti*, Cic. Att. 1, 13; *de agro*, Ib. 2, 16, *ex Tribulano*, Ib. 5, 4,

* The crude notions that Messrs. A. and G. have about the relations of place, may be best seen from the following extract from their Grammar (p. 142, 10): "LOCATIVE ABLATIVE. The ablative of the place 'where' is retained in many figurative expressions; as, 1. *jure peritus*, skilled in law [compare Sanscrit usages]. 2. *Pendens animis* (Tusc. 1, 40), we are in suspense of mind. 3. *Socius periculis vobiscum adero* (Jug. 85), I will be present with you a companion in dangers. 4. *Premittit alto corde dolorem* (En. 1, 209), he keeps down the pain deep in his heart. 5. *Conferata legione* (B. G. 4, 2), as they were in close order. 6. *Pedibus præstantur* (id. 33), they fight on foot. 7. *Quibus rebus* (id. 34), under these circumstances." Of all these passages, only No. 4, that of a poet, contains a figurative ablative of place; and, indeed, an ablative of place has never been used figuratively by any prose-writer. The first sentence contains, evidently, an ablative of specification (skilled in respect to). In the second passage, the best manuscripts read *animi*, which is received in all the critical editions. The third passage is misquoted. In Sallust Jug. stands (without a various reading) *socius periculi*. But if *periculis* really stood in this passage, it would be a dative, dependent on *adero*, and certainly not an ablative dependent on *socius*, and if it really were made dependent on *socius*, as an adjective, it would still be a dative. See A. and G.'s Gr., p. 128, 6. The fifth passage is a clear ablative absolute (the legion being compressed). The sixth passage evidently contains an ablative of means. That it has been taken as an ablative of "place," reminds us of the "*in uno pede stare*" of Mr. Allen. The seventh passage reads: *Quibus rebus perturbatis nostris novitate pugnae*, clearly meaning, "our troops being disturbed from these causes (*quibus rebus = quare*) by the novelty of the fight." It is certainly no ablative of place.

Dederam Epheso pridie, Ib. 5, 14; *a Cybistra datas*, Ib. 6, 1; *Quas Capua dedi*, Ib. 7, 16; *Lamurio datas*, Ib. 14, 20. The genitive in this connection is just as faulty as it would be to say *in equo pugnare*, for *de* or *ex equo pugnare*.—10. P. 6, 16. *Lepidus SARDINIAM navigavit*. Only names of small islands are put in the accusative to denote direction to a place. A. and G.'s L. Gr., p. 144, 3. It is true, Livy rarely uses this accusative even with names of countries, and Cic. L. M. 12, says *Sardiniam venit* (although the reading here is unsettled); but to use such constructions as typical is reprehensible.—11. P. 18, 2. *Qua dei invitant*, for *quo*, the gods not showing the way, but the aim. It is almost provoking that such Latinity is put in the mouth of Cæsar, when Suetonius, Cæs. 32, quoting his very words, uses *quo*.—12. P. 14, 4. *Consulatus ejus plebi MAGNÆ VICTORIÆ, et magnæ molestiæ nobilitati fuit* ("His election was a great victory for the common people, and a great humiliation to the aristocracy"). Here *victoriæ* cannot be used as a predicate-dative. The victory was not a consequence of the *consulatus*, nor served the *consulatus* for a victory; nor is the noun *victoria* ever used as predicate-dative. Moreover, *consulatus* is no equivalent for "election," nor *molestia* for "humiliation," which translations stand in the vocabulary. It is very obvious that these nouns have no equivalent Latin nouns, and that the English sentence given as a "poser" to the students, could not be translated by the gentlemen themselves.

13. P. 14, 13. *Brutus CIVITATI restitutus*, inst. of *in civitatem restitutus*. The dative would represent the rights of the "state" over Brutus as being restored, while it was meant to say that *Brutus* was reinstated in his rights of citizenship, which is always expressed by *in* with accusative, as: *Restituere in regnum* (not *regno*), Cic. Tusc. 3, 12. So always *in integrum restituere* (see the Lexicons). 14. P. 12, 1. *Hortensius OCTO ANNIS major erat CICERONE* (inst. of *quam Cicero*). Comparative ablatives are never used in classical Latinity, when on the same comparative an ablative of difference is dependent. On P. 12, 5, a comparative ablative is even used in connection with both an ablative of difference and an ablative of specification (*MULTO MAGNITUDINE inferiores sunt homines PLERISQUE FERIS*), a combination which no Latin author has ever used. 15. Very reprehensible is the use of an objective genitive, where it may be taken for a subjective genitive, especially when the connection

does not show in which meaning it is used, as P. 14, 11 : *Cari-tas civitatis* (which is a faulty rendering of "his love for his dominion"), *amor civium* (his affection for his subjects). *Erga* or *in*, of course, should have been used in place of a genitive.

16. Messrs. A. & G constantly confound the construction of an appositional (factive) predicate in the accusative with an apposition after *ut* (in English=as), p. 5, 5 : *Multæ gentes anti-quæ DEOS CANES FELESQUE coluerunt* ("Many nations worshipped the dog and cat as gods"). Such appositions without *ut* always represent the subject as *really* being what is attributed to it, while *ut* represents the attribute as a "supposed" quality of the subject (=according to the notion of the doer). Hence in the above sentence cats and dogs are declared to be real gods. This same sentence stands in Cicero (Leg. 1, 11) thus : "*Qui canem et felem UT DEOS colunt.* Compare Cæs. B. G. 6, 17, *DEUM maxime Mercurium colunt* (where *ut* would be wrong from Cæsar's standpoint, but correct from ours).*

D. In the following instances WRONG MOODS have been used :

1. P. 28, 1 : *Quæcunque vitia fuerint* (whatever may have been their vices), instead of *fuerunt*. Indefinite relatives "always" take the indicative. Allen & Greenough's Gr., p. 172, c.

2. P. 19, 2. *Antequam hunc circulum egredieris, senatui respon-dito.* On a slip of paper fastened to a fly-leaf, the correction *egredieris* into *egrederis* is expressly required by the authors; *i. e.*, for the future, a present indicative is substituted. Now, it so happens, that the *future* would have been at least *anteclassi-cal*, though not of classical authority (comp. : *Priusquam porcum immolabis, fano struem commoveto*, Cat. R. R. 134). But the present indicative after *antequam*, when denoting *prohibition* (as here, where the clause means "you must not leave, unless you have answered") has neither anteclassical, nor classical, nor post-classical authority. Such presents must always be in the sub-junctive. Liv. 45, 12, relating the same story, says "*Priusquam hoc circulo EXCEDAS, redde responsum.*" For the other points in which this Livian narrative has been spoiled, see below.

D. T. REILEY.

Lack of space compels us to defer the larger part of this article, now in type, until our next.
—EDITOR.

* The same faulty construction is found p. 4, 3, "*Lupa MATREM se gessit* (A she-wolf acted as mother), which sentence is taken from a bad reading of Florus 1, 1 (the correct reading being "*matrem egit*"). The construction of *se gerere* with another accusative would be in contradic-tion with its meaning. The post-classical construction is *gerere* (not *se gerere*) with an accusa-tive,—as in Just. 32, 3, "*regem gerebat*" (not *se gerebat*, which is given by some inferior codices).

ON THE DEFENSE OF MR. ALLEN'S LATINITY.

THE article on Mr. Allen's Latinity (AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL MONTHLY, Dec., 1875, p. 363) has been attacked (1) by Mr. Allen himself in the *School Bulletin* of Jan., 1876; (2) by Mr. Greenough, Prof. of Latin in Harvard College, in last month's issue of this MONTHLY.

These gentlemen give up the vagaries of Mr. Allen in the "Historia Sacra," and devote themselves to the rescue of "The Golden Egg." Both critics would give the impression that we had reviewed the Primer. We did not. It is not worth it. The assertion of the article was that any one who makes an elementary Latin book, must write "an easy and progressive reader," and we tried to prove, and think we have proved, that Mr. Allen could not. Prof. Greenough cannot excuse Mr. Allen's twenty mistakes, acknowledged by him, on about three pages, on the ground that it is a child's book, and written in haste. A child's book may be as simple as you please, but the language should be irreproachable. The problem we are discussing is how the child may have the language from the beginning in the form of the best Latinity. This, we think, is indispensable. Prof. Greenough and Mr. Allen attempt to break the force of the criticism by the charge that we were attempting to tie poor Mr. Allen down to the usage of Cicero. We have not made a single assertion resting on such an idea. But, of course, we cannot allow these gentlemen to give their Latinity even the color of correctness by the authority of mediæval or modern Latin. For there is no fault so bad as not to have been committed by the monks of the middle ages. Moreover our students learn Latin not for the sake of monkish or modern productions, but to understand the Latin Classics, as models of style, and to learn the "logic of language," which no tongue presents in a purer form than the classical Latin.

We proceed now to prove that Prof. Greenough has not succeeded in convicting us of a single error, but has revealed by his own criticism his unenviable status in the Latin language.

1. The quoted passage of Pliny 6. 16. is entirely different from the one to which we objected. Had Pliny used Mr. Allen's construction (*Acceptit codicillos Rectinæ et orabat ut se eriperet*), it would be just as objectionable, though by no means as ridiculous, as Mr. Allen's: "the old woman... laid golden eggs." As to the perfect *peperi*, this tense might have been correct in the instance supposed by Prof. Greenough (a hen, at a given time, laid during one week, golden eggs). But the trouble is, that in Mr. A.'s sentence such an addition is neither made nor implied.

2. We objected to Mr. Allen's "*phanicopterum uno in pede stantem*" for two reasons—(a), because *alter* should have been used instead of *unus*; (b) because a mere ablative should have been used instead of *in* with the ablative. Prof. Greenough thinks that this objection is disposed of by Hor. Sat. 1. 4. 10, "*Stans uno in pede*." There exists no passage, aside from this, in any prose writer or poet in which this construction occurs. If it is acknowledged that constructions in the poets cannot prove any prose usage unless they are confirmed by prose writers, this is still more true when a construction occurs only in one single passage of a poet. If Prof. Greenough should render "to die by the sword" by "*in ense mori*," does he believe it would be a sufficient excuse that Lucan (2, 264) says "*Quis noli in isto ense mori?*" Or could a prose writer say "*florere in armis*." Instead of "*florere armis*" (or *bellica laude*), as Virg. Cir. 109? Or "*in qua vulneror una*" (Ov. Am. 283)? Or "*merum in auro trahens*" (Sen. Ag. 873) instead of *ex aureis poculis*? Or "*deditus in aliqua re*" (Lucr. 3, 647) instead of *alicui rei*?

In all the periods of the language, the idea of "standing" or "walking" on a foot, or on the head, etc., is always expressed by the mere ablative, never by *in*, as: *Capite stare* or *sistere*, to (stand on the head), Plant. Curc. 2, 3, 8; Mil. 2, 2, 33. *Pedibus ire* non *quo*. Ib. Stich. 20, 2, 19. *Pedibus ambulare*, Ib. Truc. 2, 7, 46. *Pedibus reverti*, Cic. Div. 1, 26; Verr. 2, 1, 34. *Pedibus æquis transisimus*. Ib. Att. 16, 8. *Iter pedibus ingredi*, Ib. sen. 10. *Pedibus ire*. Liv. 9, 8. *Pedibus ire ferrique*, Ib. 5, 40. *Pedibus ingredi*, Curt. 7, 30. *Omni pede stare*, Quint. 12, 9. *Pedibus insistere*, Plin. 7, 2; 10, 30. *Ternis digitis insistere*, Plin. 10, 64. *Binis pedibus gradi*, Ib. 8, 55. Having proved this construction, we challenge Messrs. Allen and Greenough to show us a single passage of a prose writer, in which *stare* or *ire* in regard to the feet, head, etc., is construed with *in* and the *abl.* If they do so, we shall acknowledge that we were mistaken; but if they cannot, they must acknowledge: first, that Mr. Allen's construction is barbarous; secondly, that they have wantonly contradicted our assertion.

As to the use of *uno* instead of *altero*, Forcellini says *Alter est unus ex duobus*. But Prof. Greenough peculiarly restricts this rule, saying "*alter*" means "one instead of the other," but would be incorrect to express "one instead of two." He cites for this startling assertion, Cic. N. D. III. 3, 8: *Ac si mergetur cur te videris contueri oculis et non altero, quum idem uno asequi possim*. But here *altero* evidently means "with one eye, instead of with two," and hence Prof. G. is refuted by his own proof. Of course, Cicero could not use *altero* in the following clause,

because when one *alter* is opposed to a previous *alter*, it does not mean "the one," but "the other," and hence he had no choice but to use *uno*. The subsequent passage (N. D. 3, 4, 9), "*Cur contuerere ALTERO oculo cava non esset, quum idem obtutus esset AMBORUM*," should have sufficiently convinced him of his error. In the same way *alter* (one instead of two) is used in innumerable passages, as: *Non potest uterque sapiens esse, sed ALTER*, Cic. Ac. 2, 43. *Hannibal ALTERO oculo captus* (blind in one eye instead of seeing with both), Liv. 22, 2. So *Claudius ALTERO pede*, Nep. Ag. 8. *ALTERO lumine orbus*, Plin. 35, 36, 14. In *UTRUMQUE eandem habuit potestatem, sed usa in ALTERO est* (= only in one, instead of in both), Cic. Tusc. 1, 35. *Si ALTERA parte claudet respublica*, Liv. 22, 39. *Apelles imaginem Antigoni latere tantum ALTERO ostendit*, Quint. 11, 3, 118. *Oculo Philanis semper ALTERO plorat: Quo fiat istud, quaeritis modo?* *Lusca est*, Mart. 4, 65. *Ex duobus quorum ALTERUM petis* (i. e., one, not two), Plin. Ep. 1, 7. In all these passages, Prof. G. would have to correct *alter* into *unus*.

We have never asserted that *alter* must be used in every instance when one of two is to be expressed. It is confined to those instances when one of a pair is spoken of, and when it is indifferent whether the one or the other is meant. In this case, the use of *unus* is wrong, and, if used, designates that only one of the two exists. To show that this is not a "creation of the critic's brain," as Prof. G. asserts, we refer him to the following passages: *Lumenque quod UNUM fronte geris media*, Ov. Met. 14, 772. *Produntur Arminuspi, UNO oculo in fronte insignes*, Plin. 7, 2. So with *singuli* instead of *unus*: *Esse apud ultimas terras miracula, homines singulis cruribus saltatim currentes*, Gell. 9, 4. (Mr. Allen, in another passage of the Golden Egg, makes the hens "singulis pedibus circumstantes," which means that they were one-legged.)

As to the Horatian passage (by which, as we have shown above, nothing can be proved), we believe that it has been misunderstood. Horace intends to give a proof of Lucilius's faulty verses, saying *Fuit hoc villosus: In hora saepe ducentos versus dictabat stans, pede in uno*, which means "He often made two hundred verses in one hour without taking a seat (at his writing-table), and in one uninterrupted flow of the verses." *Pes* frequently stands instead of *carmen* or *versus*, and *unus* has the same meaning (=uninterrupted), as in *uno tenore*. *Pede in uno* means "without interrupting the flow of his verses," i. e., without attending to their correct and laborious composition. In Sat. 1, 10, where he proves the correctness of his criticism against Lucilius, he repeats this censure, expressly referring to it, by saying "*Nempe in composito dixi pede currere versus Lucili*." Here "*in composito pede*" has exactly the same meaning as *uno in pede* in Sat. 1, 4, since the uninterrupted flow of the verses must prevent their "*componi*" according to the rules of art. It is utterly impossible that Horace should have connected *stans* with *uno in pede*, which would represent Lucilius as having stood on one foot for one hour while making two hundred verses. This is awkward nonsense, and hence the interpreters said, that *stare uno in pede* must have been a proverb, not considering that there is not the slightest trace of such a proverb, and that, in any case, it could not mean "great ease in doing something," or (as others say) "doing something very quickly," because, as they say, no one can stand long on one foot. This is refuted by the "*in hora*" of Horace. Be this, however, as it may, Mr. A. had no business to imitate the hapax legomenon of a poet against a fully established and frequent prose usage; nor had Prof. Greenough any business to volunteer his crude and empty ideas about the use of *alter*, and lay them down as established rules. Mr. A. is welcome to "his revenge."

2. c. The passage adduced by Prof. Greenough cannot excuse the improper *deponere* of Mr. Allen. *Deponere* means to "lay down," and hence is used properly with *mentum* or with *caput* (as in Plaut. Curc. 2, 3, 81), etc. But it cannot be used of a foot which is drawn upward and hidden away, or, as Mr. Allen says, "tucked away." The latter gentleman says that he will be thankful to us for suggesting to him a better expression than *deponere*. *Ascondere* and *retrahere* (or his own *retrahere*, which he afterward uses in the same sense) would correctly express the meaning, while *deponere* is absolutely senseless here.

2. d. The construction *desigere* with *in*, and the acc. in the literal meaning to place or fasten, is ungrammatical, for which we refer Prof. G. to his much-admired Latman & Müller, p. 111: "The verba ponendi, as *ponere*, *desigere*, etc., take the ablative with *in*." Prof. Greenough says that the construction with *in* and the acc. seems to be in Plautus. Not only in Plautus, but also in Cic. Ac. 2, 15, 46; Plin. H. N. 8, 19; and Quint. 11, 3, 158—but only in the meaning "to direct the mind or the eyes to something," which is certainly no placing in a literal sense. In Caesar B. G. 4, 17, "*inmissa in flumen defixerat fistucisque adederat*" the *in flumen* must be connected with "*inmissa*." This "downright" violation of Latin syntax stands unrefuted.

3. a. Prof. G. acknowledges our censure of "*pae tua dicam*" but not so Mr. Allen. We said it cannot refer to the subsequent question, being opposed to it by *sed*. Mr. Allen simply asserts that it, nevertheless, refers to that question. That is a specimen of hen's logic which Mr. Allen seriously says he has tried to imitate. Now, he also adopts it in his pleadings.

3. b. Prof. G. cannot defend a senseless "*sed*" by the ellipsis of a whole period, unless he

produces passages in which *sed*, in the beginning of a period, restricts a thought, not expressed, but supplied *ad libitum*. His authority has no value.

4. Prof. G. produces the sentence, "*Quæcunque causa vos huc attulisset, latareri*," as an extreme case, and as a proof that a hypothetical construction (*latareri*) may be used although the predicate is not contrary to fact (because he was glad). But he overlooks that his sentence is concessive, and that the apodosis of conditional clauses with concessive meaning is never contrary to fact, although the protasis is, and yet regularly takes the subjunctive of imperfect or pluperfect, as: *Si (=etiamsi) mihi numquam amicus Cæsar fuisset, tamen ei non amicus esse non possem* (he means to say that he was really his friend and would be so even if, etc.). Cic. Pis. 33. So Cic. Phil. 13, 8, 17, and often. Hence, what Prof. G. calls an "extreme case" is a regular construction—which proves that he never has examined into the grammatical nature of these clauses. But Mr. Allen's faulty period has no concessive sense, and hence Prof. G.'s example is entirely out of place. He tries to refute us by saying that the hen had not been talking impudently. Mr. A. said: "Had not the hen been without culture, she would have been talking impudently." We said that the apodosis is not contrary to fact, and hence could not have its verb in a secondary tense (which is, by the by, not the only fault in this construction). Now the hen had either been talking impudently or not. If not, of what use was it to excuse her talking by the fact that she had no culture? Hence her talking was impudent, and the apodosis is not contrary to fact, and Mr. A. has not only used a faulty tense, but also a senseless construction. The protasis "*had the hen been better educated*" requires such an apodosis as "*she would have talked more politely or modestly*," but not "*she would have talked impudently*."

Aside from this, the use of *aliter* in the sense given to it by Mr. Allen is utterly un-Latin and faulty, which we shall prove as soon as Prof. Greenough will have compromised himself by attempting to prove its correctness. As to *mundi consuetudines*, we did not object to *consuetudines* (which occurs in Cicero), but to *mundi*. Mr. Allen might have imitated Cic. Phil. 2, 4, "*Vitæ communis ignarus*." As to our rendering, which Prof. G. calls dull and missing the point, we have borrowed it from Cicero (Sull. 13): "*Galli qui vitam hominum non nossent, quæsierunt*," etc., which strictly corresponds to "the hen, since she did not know the habits of the other birds, asked rather frankly," etc. As to losing the point, we certainly avoided Mr. Allen's faulty conditional period, expressing exactly what Mr. Allen wished, but failed properly to express, namely, that the hen's unacquaintance with social manners was the cause of her asking a rather frank (or impertinent) question. The "*mirror*," etc., expresses in classical form, what Mr. Allen bunglingly expressed by "*sed quomodo*," etc. *Num* (which is not an equivalent of Prof. G.'s "you don't—do you," but simply indicates that a negative answer is expected) is correct, since the hen surely did not believe in the one-leggedness of the flamingo.

5 a. We said that no plan was mentioned, and wondered what it was. Prof. Greenough says this is absurd (sic), but forgets what he has said in the next sentence, and lays the possible fault upon the author. Now we say (a) that Mr. Allen had no right to turn any nonsense of the author into Latin, as Mr. A.'s Latin had enough absurdity without it; and (b) that the author's idea was clear, but Mr. A. made nonsense of it by omitting essential parts.

5 b. When Prof. G. says that this rule is not exclusive, it was clearly his duty to mention the passages in which it is not observed. Failing to do this, he substitutes his own authority which is nothing, for that of the classics. It is almost witty, when Mr. Allen adds that by actual count in Cicero, the non-exclusiveness of the rule is proved. Who has ever made such an actual count? Mr. Allen? Why does he not give one single passage of any ancient writer? We refer Messrs. A. & G. to Cic. Fam. 1, 3, 43; Ib. Verr. 2, 1, 23; 2, 1, 54, and expect they at least will give one example of the exceptions they have discovered in their actual count, or again acknowledge the frivolity and untrustworthiness of their statements.

5 c. Prof. G.'s passage, Cic. Flacc. 27, 64, has not the slightest bearing on the construction censured by us. We said that "the only one which ever" cannot be rendered by using *unquam*. This can only be refuted by producing a passage in which *unquam* is used after *unus, solus*, etc. We, of course, cannot prove a negative by direct evidence, but we can give examples in which *unquam* after *unus*, etc., is not used, although we would use it in English, as: Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 12, *Cedo mihi unum*, etc.; Ib. 2, 1, 3, *Verris unus inventus est qui*, etc. *Unquam* after *unus qui* expresses the idea "*this certain thing*," the *unum*, has ever been done," which is in conflict with the meaning of *unquam*. By trying to refute us with an example in which *unquam* refers to an indefinite and negative antecedent, Prof. G. shows that he does not know the force of *unquam*.

5 d. The same remarks apply to the use of *neis* after *unicum*. No Latin writer ever made such an illogical connection. That *unicum* implies a negative is indifferent, since by actually substituting a negative construction, the whole sentence would be essentially altered. It would be "No plan ever entered the mind of hens, except that of laying golden eggs, except that of their daily bread." The grotesqueness of this construction must strike even Messrs. A. & G.

Our rendering loses the *point* of the nonsense, but no other. We said "that plan is the only one that enters the mind," which is tantamount to "that has ever entered the minds."

5e. We did not censure Mr. Allen for taking *pertineat* as a subjunctive of "characteristic," but for referring it to a rule which no mind, however ingenious, much less the members of the Kindergarten, could possibly apply to this sentence. Messrs. A. & G. say that the "best grammarians" treat the subjunctive as a case under "subj. of result." This may be, or may not be, but it is a fact that Mr. Allen in his primer rules has not mentioned the "subj. of characteristic." Messrs. A. & G. in *their larger grammar* simply say that the subjunctive of characteristic (which they do not define) is a subj. of result, *even if it expresses no result* (p. 184, 2). They tacitly admit that *pertineat* does not express result. Hence they demand that their Kindergarten pupils should understand this subjunctive to be a subj. of result, *although it expresses no result*, without even having the benefit of the almost cynical statement in their grammar. But this is not all. Mr. Allen, in his primer rules, transfers what is the nature of the predicate (namely, the "result") to the connecting relative *qui*, saying that it is *qui*, which denotes the result. What enormous confusion must, by such statements, be created in the minds of any student? How can, anyhow, a primer student understand *anything* of the subjunctive of result and characteristic, even if imparted to him in the very clearest and simplest language? What necessity was there for Mr. Allen to use in his passage a subjunctive of characteristic, since only by a violent stretch of the Latin rules can such a subjunctive be defended in this connection? How could Messrs. Allen & Greenough feel offended at our mild rebuke for all these enormities? How can they have the front to refer the critic to those elementary rules, which they themselves have so shockingly treated?

5f. Every Latinist knows or should know the peculiar office of *inquam* in direct quotations. Mr. A. has transferred this force to the verb *rogare*, which we challenged. With this Mr. A. expressly, and Prof. G. impliedly, find fault. Until they allege passages in which *rogare* is used in this way, they should not demur to a proper correction.

6. We did not, in our translation of the passage, give *factum est* as absolutely necessary, nor did we censure Mr. A. for its omission. We said that there was an *ambiguity*, and suggested a way to remove it, which mainly was contained in the "*quedam*." This ambiguity is owing to Mr. A.'s mutilation of the story, alluded to above. In the original, the fact that *in those days* some hen had laid golden eggs is mentioned in the beginning of the fable. The translator, by leaving this out, introduces here the hen with her golden eggs like a *denus ex machina*. Nobody can tell whether a *certain* hen is meant, or hens in general, or a hen spoken of before. If the last, it must be *gallina illa*; if the first, *gallina quedam*; if hens in general, the tense must be changed. The original clears up the ambiguity.

7a. The use of *inmo* in the meaning "yes" is a plain violation of grammar, which we find also in A. & G.'s Lat. Gram. (p. 201, 3 a), where they enumerate *inmo* among the particles which have the meaning "yes." The mistaken opinion of some that *inmo* occurs in this meaning, has been long since corrected (see Hand. Turs. 3. p. 228, 16). Since Mr. A. also adds that the classical Latinity has no equivalent for "yes," which he repeats in his grammars, we may tell him that *etiam* is the equivalent for yes, as may be seen from the following passages: *Dialectici statuerunt, aut ETIAM aut NON, necessarium esse* (that "yes" or "no" is necessary) Cic. Ac. 2, 30, 97; see Ib. 2, 32, 104; N. D. 1, 25, 70.

7b. In the passage cited by Prof. G., "*hæc res est*" does not mean "this is the matter," but "that is a fact," which is very different from what Mr. A. wanted to express. He says that the three impatient monosyllables "*hæc res est*" are better *hen's Latin* than our "*id agitur*," which we acknowledge. But men's Latin in the meaning "*id agitur*," they are not.

8a. *Consulo* did not, as Mr. Allen says, acquire the meaning "to advise" in later use. It is a monkish barbarism.—8b. Our assertion that "*discere bonos mores*" is an Anglicism, cannot be refuted by the passages of Messrs. A. & G. In none of them is *discere* connected with *mores*.

9a. We said that after verbs of thinking, a direct quotation cannot be used *without a connective*. To refute this, Prof. G. cites a passage in which a direct quotation is introduced *with* a connective. This use of *sic* (*id, hoc cogitabam*) is frequent in Terence (Hean. 3, 3, 46; 4, 1, 28), but neither occurs in Plautus, nor in the classics. Mr. A. used it, however, without *etc* or any other connective, when an infinitive clause, as we repeat, is absolutely necessary.

9b. We did not change the punctuation when we left out the dash. The Latins used *no dashes*, and what is wrong without a dash cannot be made right by a dash. Prof. G.'s customary attempt to explain away the monstrosity of Mr. A.'s sentences by an ellipsis, will not work here. It would be necessary (1) to admit an ellipsis of the predicate, in the first half of the sentence, whereas the following words are clearly meant to be this predicate; (2) to admit an ellipsis of an impossible subject in the second half of the sentence. For the speaker did not mean to say "that the hen should lay one egg a day, is not enough," because she did not want the hen

to lay two or three eggs a day, but to have them all at once. The only possible subject is the one really expressed by Mr. A., namely "one egg on every day." The original has the plain construction without a dash "one egg a day is not enough." Evidently Mr. A. was helpless in rendering this sentence. He thought that he must use a plural subject *singula ona* (which was not absolutely necessary), and imagined that he could not say *satis sunt* (which would have been excellent Latin). Hence he said "*satis est*," thinking that he could overcome the disagreement of the subject and predicate by a dash, which, of course, he could not.

9 d. Mr. A. likes his dramatic style better than ours. Prof. G. upbraids us with losing the vivacity of the original. Vivacity and dramatic style "belong to Latin rhetoric, and before ascending into these regions, Messrs. Allen and Greenough had better give themselves to the study of ordinary grammatical constructions and to a thorough drill in the formation of tenses and cases, that no such slips as *aduberunt*, *relinquerunt*, and *sentierat* may occur; and then, but not till then, it will be time to consider Latin rhetoric and dramatic style.

9 e. Prof. G. declares our remark to be untrue, saying that the imperfect indicative in hypothetical use refers to present time, a statement which is also in A. and G's. Lat. Gr. Hence they render *satius erat* with "it were better" (Gr. p. 169), and *oportebat* by "it ought to be [now], but is not." This erroneous theory was first proposed by Madvig. Before him no grammarian doubted that *satius erat* meant "it would have been better," and *oportebat* "it ought to have been" (see Zumpt, Kühner, etc.). Madvig's theory has been adopted by one or two grammarians, and also is thoughtlessly copied in A. and G's. Lat. Grammars. In fact imperfect indicatives, if used hypothetically (contrary to reality), in classical prose and ante-classical style, always refer to past time with the force of a *pluperfect subjunctive*, but in a few passages refer to both the past and the present, but never so that they might not be rendered "would have." Especially *oportebat*, *dabebat*, etc., never occur in the meaning "ought to be," but always mean "ought to have been." The passages adduced by Prof. G. (copied from Madvig), have been misunderstood. In Att. 2, 1, *si mihi omnes ut erat æquum faverent, erat æquum* means it would have been fair, referring to the time indicated in the next sentence (*quem collocaram*). L. M. 17, 50, must be rendered "were Pompey here in Rome, he ought to have been elected and sent to the war long ago." The addition "*atque mittendus*," left out in Prof. G's. quotation, places this interpretation beyond doubt. To prove the correctness of our theory and the falsity of Prof. G's. views, we refer to the following passages: *Hostes sustineri non poterant* (could not have been) *ne extraordinaria cohortes se objectissent*, Liv. 7, 7. So *poterat* occurs Liv. 45, 30; Cic. Quinc. 26; Pis. 6, 13; Rub. 10, 28; Thuc. 2, 17, and often. *Archipirata Syracusia, quoniam in Syracusano captus erat, custodiri oportebat* (ought to have been), Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 27. So *oportebat* is used Verr. 2, 3, 55; Ib. 2, 4, 32; Ib. 2, 1, 54; Ib. 2, 1, 61; Sest. 3, 7; Plant. Men. 1, 3, 21; Ter. Heaut. 4, 5, 37; and often. *Tum, quum fungi munere debebamus* (ought to have administered), *iteram nullam fecimus*, Cic. Ac. 2, 2, 6. So *debebam* is used Cic. Phil. 2, 38; N. D. 3, 32; Liv. 45, 38; Cic. Fin. 4, 9, 23; Div. 2, 64; Ib. 2, 43; Fin. 4, 1; Ib. 4, 23; Off. 1, 9, 28; and very frequently in Livy. *Etenim erat iniquum* (it would have been unfair) *homini præscripto quidquam dari*, Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 47. So Off. 3, 18. *Satis erat* (it would have been enough) *respondere "magnas;" "ingentes" inquit*, Cic. Am. 26. Compare Plant. Mil. 3, 1, 158; Ib. Rud. 1, 5, 13; Cic. Att. 13, 23; Fam. 7, 14; Rose. Am. 21; Ac. 2, 43; Pis. 8; N. D. 1, 30; Ib. 1, 32; Ib. 1, 89; Mil. 24; Div. 2, 38; Phil. 8, 10; Liv. 44, 6. The poets often use these imperfects in a present sense, as they may substitute almost any tense for almost any other. Hence the authors of the silver age occasionally follow this usage. *Satius erat* we have found only once in a hypothetical sense, and there with the force of *satius fuisset*, Sen. Br. V. 13. We have made these remarks solely to prove that Prof. G. does not derive his grammatical theories, as he should, from the classic authors, but at second hand from some other grammarians, without examining the correctness of the theory. Knowing this, he should be careful in his attacks upon others. *Consulo tibi ut mores prudentes discas*.

But all this does not concern our charge against Mr. Allen's "*satius erat*." Mr. A. cannot plead that he used *satius erat* in the sense of *satius esset*, simply because the clause "it would be better to dissect the hen" (i.e., if I dissect the hen), is not contrary to fact, seeing that the old woman represents this very thing as her purpose, which is immediately executed. Prof. G's remark, that this "it would be better," really implies the contrary, is another proof (see No. 4) of his inability to analyze conditional sentences. By this reasoning, there would be no conditional present or future which might not be changed into an imperfect subjunctive.

10 a. In Ov. Met. 1, 65, *septem trio* denotes a quarter of the compass, but not a northern country, as Mr. A. has used it. And we might in poetry translate this verse into literal English, "Grim Boreas invades the seven stars." But nobody would infer from such a use that we could even in poetry, say "I have traveled in the seven stars," meaning a northern country.

10 c. Prof. G. cannot refute our stricture of Mr. A.'s un-Latin connection of sentences by the general assertion, "nothing is so loose as the connection of sentences in Terence." Ter-

ence uses *asyndeta* when the thoughts connect *themselves*, but Mr. A.'s *asyndeta* arise from his inability to think in Latin. His connections are *English*, but not *Latin*.

10 d. For Prof. G.'s statement that *alias* is rather late, but not unknown, see No. 5 and 6.

10 e. Prof. G.'s statement that the idea of cause and consequence in *cum* temporal has long been exploded is simply untrue. He does not himself believe in his statement, else he would not in his latest book (*Latin Composition*, 1875) have advanced this very theory, saying (p. 67): "If *WHEN* or *WHILE* approaches in meaning to *SINCE*, it is expressed by *cum* with the subjunctive." Indeed, the latest *Latin Grammar* (Rohy, *Syntax*, p. 314) says: "With *cum* (temporal) the subjunctive implies that the action exercises an influence on the action in the principal sentence," which statement means very nearly the same, as what we expressed by "if the principal action is the *consequence* of the dependent action." Neither Hoffman nor Lattman & Müller (whose obscure and inferior *Grammar* is not "the one commonly used in Germany," being still in its first edition of 1864) can explode an irrefutable theory. Of course we did not think of saying that the relation of logical consequence is the only one in which the subjunctive occurs in temporal *Quum*-clauses. But wherever the main action is expressly represented as the *consequence* of the clause, a subjunctive is necessary in the latter, as: *Hunc tu, quum esses Athenis, cognovisti*, Cic. Or. 30, 105. *Quum mecum in Tusculano esses, incidisti in Aristotelis Topica*, Top. 1, 1. *Zenonem, quum Athenis essem, audiebam frequenter*, N. D. 1, 21. The passages by which Mr. Allen defends his indicative, are most unfortunately chosen, since his "*cum pellebam*" contains a copulative imperfect which always is in the indicative, and his *cum mīdaram* is a pluperfect of repeated action, which, at least according to Cicero, must likewise be in the indicative. Not much better is Prof. G.'s attempt to defend the indicative as referring to a particular time. For, in the first place, there is no particular time referred to in Mr. Allen's sentence; and, secondly, the use of mood does not at all depend on particular or general time. The passages quoted above, all refer to particular time, and yet have the subjunctive.

10 f. Prof. G.'s passage, Cic. Ac. 2, 46, 141 (from Rohy's Gram.), is no imperative sentence at all (= and you will not consider me less of a man than yourself). But even if it were, it would not invalidate our statement. Of course, "*noli putare*" cannot be used in co-ordinations, because we cannot say "*nec veli putare*." We spoke of *ne existimaris*, not of *nec existimaris*. Mr. A.'s examples have no bearing on verbs of *believing*, to which alone we referred, and moreover they *confirm* our rule. All these negative subjunctives (occurring Cic. Mur., 31, 65) refer to the *Stoic laws*, being used in connection with *FUTURE imperatives*, as the corresponding affirmative form for commands. Future imperatives have the same office in affirmative sentences as subjunctive perfects after *ne* in prohibitions.

10 g. There is no supposed *inquit* in the imperative sentence with which Mr. A. has co-ordinated his declarative sentence. This *inquit* stands before the *sixth* sentence, counting backward, which would be a novel kind of co-ordination. "That *et* connects sentences in all sorts of relations" is too wild a statement to deserve refutation.

10 h. We charged Mr. A. with inventing the word *superblosse*. Mr. A. says he wanted just that word "for comic description." Unfortunately the ending *ous* (see all Grammars) denotes abundance, but has not a trace of "comic" meaning.

11 a. We do not understand Prof. G.'s excuse of Mr. Allen's blunders by "natural for anybody writing in haste." Does Mr. Allen with his knowledge of Latin write his books in haste? Mr. A. most unfortunately excuses his use of *meminisse* as a preterite in meaning, by *odivil* in *Phil.* 13, 19. Did he not see that Cicero quotes this word from Antonius to *ridicule* him for its use? Moreover, does he not know that *odivi* is no preteritive verb at all, but a regularly formed (though not existing) perfect of the anteclassical *odio, odire*?

11 b. For the remark that our rule is not exclusive, see again what we say No. 5 b.

11 c. Prof. G., who, under No. 2, has given ample evidence that he has no idea of the use of *alter* in the meaning "one," shows here that neither does he know it in the meaning "other." Of course we could not give in a few lines exhausting rules about the use of *alter*, but confined ourselves to the general rule, "*alter means the other of two*" (see Forcellini). To this rule there are several exceptions, or rather idiomatic applications, differing from the English use of "the other." (1) It is used with the force of *alter-alterum* with reference to indefinite subjects, where we use "another" in English, as: *Omnia quæ vindicari* (indefinite II. person) in *ALTERO, tibi ipsi vehementer fugienda sunt*, Verr. 2, 3, 2 (i. e. what one censures in another = *alter in alterum*, he must himself, etc.). To this class belongs Prof. G.'s example, Cic. N. D. 1, 17, but not Mr. Allen's use, since his *alteri* refers to a definite subject, and cannot be replaced by *alter-alteri*. (2) If it is conceived as signifying "a second one." Here belongs the peculiar idiomatic use of the comics who connect *nemo alter* with a comparative or its equivalent, as: *Alter hoc Athenis nemo doctior dici potest* (literally "no second person can be called more

learned than he), *Plant. Most.* 5, 1, 23. See *Ib.* 1, 3, 13; *Mil.* 2, 3, 42; *Pers.* 4, 4, 16, and the lexicons. So (rarely) in *Cic.*: *Domum num quis alter prater se regit?* *Rep.* 1, 39 (i. e., is your house governed by some second person, beside you?) Mr. A.'s use of *alter* certainly does not fall under this idiom, because its essential condition, the comparative, is wanting. (3.) Lastly, the use of the genitive *alterius* with the force of *alius* (which is extremely rare) according to Prof. Greenough's own statement (*Grammar* p. 35, note). Here belongs *Liv.* 21, 13 (*nec ullius alterius*), quoted by both Prof. G. and Mr. A., where they seem to have forgotten what they said in their own *Grammar*. *Comp. Liv.* 22, 14, 4; 26, 8, 2; 28, 37, 6. Of course this use cannot be pleaded for Mr. A.'s dative *alteri*. Hence not only is Mr. A.'s use of *alter* not refuted, but he and Prof. G. have furnished us with additional proofs of their unacquaintance with the force of the Latin pronominal words.

11 d. Our rule that "*else*" can only be rendered by *alius* (or the genitive *alterius*) when we may supply a phrase with "*than*," Prof. G. says is refuted by *Liv.* 21, 13 (*vestra causa nec ullius alterius*). Mr. G. is refuted by his own passage, since obviously "*quam vestra*" must be supplied here after *alterius* (for the sake of no other person than you).

12 a. In Mr. A.'s *mane erat* (*Ov. Fast.* 1, 547) *mane* has simply the meaning "early hour." So it has in Prof. G.'s passage *Plin. Ep.* 1, 5 (which is found in the lexicons), as is evident from the *plane mane*, which certainly cannot mean "quite to-morrow." A much better place to prove that *mane* is used in the meaning *cras*, would be *Cic. Tusc.* 5, 41 (which is *not* found in the lexicons). But we did not deny *this*, simply stating that *mane* does not mean *posthodie*, and that the latter should have been added: This connection is so frequent in classical prose that it is almost like a formula. See *Verr.* 2, 4, 66; *Ib.* 2, 1, 27; 2, 2, 38, and the passages in the lexicons.

12 b. It is generally assumed that the *dum hæc gerebantur* in *Liv.* 10, 36, is a corrupted reading instead of *cum gerebantur* (*Comp. Liv.* 36, 5). At any rate the passage is marked by all grammarians as deviating from a universal and extremely frequent use. A modern Latinist who singles out for imitation passages of this kind is either perverse or ignorant. Anyhow, we must not imitate "the vices of the great," much less "teach" it our pupils. *Quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi*. But Mr. Allen is accustomed to construe *dum* with an imperfect, giving it in his *Manual* as a typical form for the use of the imperfect: "*Dum hæc gerebantur* while this was going on," p. 28. "*Dum agrum arabat, in hortum veni*, while he was ploughing, etc.," p. 4. He now excuses himself for having used it because he thought the imperfect "a shade more vividly descriptive." Strange! In his *Grammar* he states that the *historical present* is more lively than a preterite (p. 158), and here he has used a *preterite*, because he thought the preterite more lively than a historical present.

12 c. *Ceteri* cannot refer to *ea*, because it is the subject of a dependent clause, and cannot be at the same time the subject of the principal sentence, which must always contain the person or thing opposed to *ceteri*. It can never be thus opposed to *itself*.

13. Prof. G. will find that past predicates represented as lasting till another action happens, are always placed in the perfect, except when the imperfect is used to denote repeated action. *Comp. Cic. Mil.* 10, 23; *Ib.* 20, 54; *Att.* 4, 16; *Flac.* 7, 41; *Liv.* 22, 38; *Cic. Dej.* 4, 11; *Cæs. B. G.*, 5, 17, and often. Mr. A. says that he has used it for the sake of pathetic description. But he neither could mean to describe where he simply narrates, nor to "pathetically" describe. "Description" is altogether too loose a term on which to rest the use of an imperfect. The description, at any rate, must be such that the action is represented as *incomplete* at the given time, which certainly is not the case when the action is expressly represented with a terminus.

Prof. G. says that the comedians "constantly" use the imperfect where by all rules we should expect the perfect. We emphatically deny this. Prof. G. makes this startling assertion also in his *Grammar*, the proof of which he rests on the following passages: *Ad amicum Callidem quoi rem ægerat mandasse hic suam*, *Trin.* 956. *Præ sagibat animus frustra me ire quum exibat domo*, *Anl.* 222. Prof. G.'s statement is made ridiculous by the following passages of *Cicero*: *Eodem illa etiam differemus quod Chrysippum dicere ægeras* (i. e. just now, only once—exactly as in *Plaut. Trin.*) *Cic. N. D.* 3, 7, 18. *Scævolam ita dicere ægerat* (just now, and only once), *bonam partem sermonis*, *Or.* 2, 3. The very sentence of *Pl. Anl.* produced by Prof. G. is quoted by *Cicero* himself as a proverb, only that the subjunctive *erem* is substituted for *exibat* (*Div.* 1, 31), according to the then prevailing use of the subjunctive. He surely would not have substituted a *perfect*, as Prof. G. says that he would expect. What Prof. G. calls a loose use of the imperfect, is one of the typical forms of this tense; what he calls an imperfect peculiar to the "comedians" is one of the most usual cases of this tense in the classics.

14 a. Here Prof. G.'s unacquaintance with Latin grammar has played him a sad trick. He calls it a "bad blunder" of ours that we made the sequence of tenses dependent on the next governing predicate, and not on the principal predicate of the whole sentence. We could scarcely believe our eyes, till we had informed ourselves by his *Grammar* that this is really his opinion.

All Grammars, except A. & G.'s, pre-suppose, as a matter of course, that the tense of a subjunctive is determined by its own governing predicate, and not by the principal predicate of the latter. Compare: *Negas me audire, quasi tibi quum me rogares responderim*. Cic. Fam. 7, 27. Here the tense of *responderim* is determined by *negas* and the tense of *rogares* by *responderim*, but not by *negas*, as Prof. G. demands, who, of course, must change *rogares* into *rogas* or *rogaveris*.—*Quæro, cum is dies venisset feceris*, etc., Cic. Vat. 14. Here the tense of *feceris* is determined by *quæro*, but that of *venisset* by *feceris*, not by *quæro*. According to Prof. G.'s theory *venisset* must be changed into *venierit* because *he* makes it dependent on *quæro*. See Cic. Vat. 9, 21; Verr. 2, 4, 6; Ib. 2, 44; 2, 5, 61; Tusc. 2, 17; Fin. 3, 32, 75; Ib. 4, 13, 22; Clu. 60, 164; Or. 59, 210, and on almost every fourth page of Cicero. The same rules on sequence of tenses prevail when the principal predicate is a historical present; on'y, that after this tense, according to a known principle, both sequences, the present and the preterite, are admitted; so that the predicate immediately dependent on the historical present may be either a primary or a secondary (to use Prof. G.'s terminology). But clauses *dependent on such clauses* take their tenses either in a primary, if the next predicate is a primary, or in a secondary, if it is a secondary, as: *Monet ut provideat ne palam res agatur*. Cic. Rosc. Am. 38. Comp. Ib. 9, 25; Verr. 2, 1, 26; Ib. 2, 1, 50; Tusc. 3, 30; Verr. 2, 5, 39. *Scribit ut iis qui a Verre venissent responderent*. Cic. Verr. 2, 4, 18. Comp. Cæs. B. G. 1, 7; Sall. Cat. 44, 3; Jug. 23, 35; 38, 9; Liv. 22, 4, and oft'n. But here, as in many other instances, the use of *logical tenses* is allowed, i.e. of tenses expressing the actual time of the action, so that *even if* the next preceding predicate is in the present, the predicate nevertheless may take a secondary tense according to the logical meaning of the tense. To this exceptional (but quite frequent) usage belongs the example cited by Prof. G., which he has borrowed from Roby L. G., p. 207, not very happily, because the reading of this passage happens to be doubtful (*conveniant* instead of *convenient*). Had Mr. A. made use of this exceptional construction (*ut videat quid nasceretur*), we certainly would not have found fault with it. We may, in the case of a historical present, use tenses either by strict sequence, or we may use *logical tenses*. But we cannot use a tense that neither follows the rules of sequence, nor is a logical tense. Just this was our objection to Mr. A.'s *partum foret*. Independently the tense would be a future, "what will be born." This tense may become either a present or an imperfect, but it *cannot* become a *pluperfect*. Hence, Mr. A.'s violation of an elementary rule remains unrefuted, while Prof. G. shows that he does not know even the simplest rules on sequence of tenses. This is Prof. G.'s "boomerang."

14 b. However loosely the verb *parere* may be used (which we deny), it is certainly wrong to use it in the meaning to *hatch out*, simply because it means to lay eggs, but never "to hatch eggs." Prof. G. wonders "why we did not suggest the real technical word *excludere*," to which we reply: (1.) There are *two* real technical words for "to hatch," namely, *excudere* and *excludere*, the former being mainly used by Varro (eight times), the latter by Columella and Pliny. But all these writers (including Cicero) use also *edere*, *nasci*, and *excubare*. To return the question: Why did not Prof. G. know that there were *two* technical words for *to hatch*? We answer: Because only *excludere*, but not *excudere*, stands in the English-Latin lexicons. (2.) We suggested *nasci* (a) because the eggs were said to be of solid gold, and both *excludere* and *excudere*, as also *edere*, represent the thing as coming from the interior, presupposing a shell and the inside matter of the egg, and (b) because *excudere* and *excludere* are used only of really living pullets. Hence we followed Cic. Div. 2, 65: *Ut ex ovo nasceretur thesaurus*.

15 a. Prof. G. coolly calls our criticism on *vive vale* as simply absurd. He refers us to Hor. Sat. 2, 5, 110 and Ep. 1, 6, 67. These very passages and, in addition, Plant. Mil. 4, 8, 30 (where Paestrio takes an affectionate farewell of his friends), we had in view when writing our criticism. The Horatian passages express the same tender farewell of friends (Live long and happy). We think that these are the only passages in which this connection occurs, and the strict form *vive vale* is nothing but a hapax legomenon. How dare Prof. G. attempt to prove us "absurd" by the very passages clearly showing the correctness of our theory?

15 b. Nothing characterizes Prof. G.'s utter helplessness in puncto Latinitatis better than this remark. He has no time to hunt up passages to show our error. A man who, by publishing books on grammar and composition, has set himself up as an authority, ought to have such passages in promptu and in his *collections*. In fact almost all the passages adduced by Prof. G., except one or two indifferent ones, are found in the lexicon, or Roby's Grammar. And how comes it, to illustrate by the point in question, that in his Grammar, which may be called a second edition of Allen's Manual, he has *struck out* a sentence of Mr. Allen's in which the participle in *urus* was used exactly in the way which we have condemned, while he left all the rest of the same paragraph virtually unaltered? (Comp. p. 89, of Manual, where Mr. A. says, *homines mitit agrum araturos*, which formula is left out in the Grammar, p. 183.) Why does he censure us for objecting to what he himself has rejected?

D. T. REILEY.